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Minister’s Foreword 
It gives me great pleasure to present this report ‘Getting smarter about smart cities: 
Improving data privacy and data security’. 
The report is the first publication from the Government Data Forum, a group that brings 
together experts from across a wide range of sectors including researchers, industry, civil 
society, legal experts and the public sector to examine the data privacy and protection 
challenges posed by the digital age. The Forum is the first of its kind internationally to 
gather together such a wide range of stakeholders to contribute to the wider debate that 
we need to have as a society about our data. We need to look at how we use them, what we 
exchange for them, the great uses they can be put to - if handled correctly - to improve our 
lives and help address some of the big challenges we face, and the norms that we will settle 
on and accept as technology develops further. 
Ireland is uniquely well-placed to harness the potential of data. We have many of the 
world’s top technology and data focused multinationals on these shores, a thriving 
indigenous technology enterprise sector, and excellent collaboration between academic 
research institutions and industry, underpinned by a targeted approach by Government to 
support science and innovation.   
This report, commissioned from Professor Rob Kitchin of the National Institute for Regional 
and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA) at Maynooth University, provides an excellent overview of the 
innovative technological approaches that are been taken internationally in the management 
of Smart Cities.  
The report serves as a reminder that Smart Cities bring huge potential benefits in producing 
more efficient, productive, sustainable, resilient, transparent, fair and equitable cities. We 
need to ensure that we carve a path that allows us to harness these benefits while at the 
same time, ensuring that we do not compromise data privacy, data protection or data 
security. Having read this report and its recommendations, I am confident that we can do 
this, and that Ireland can set an example internationally in embracing these emerging 
technologies while creating a trusted, transparent and balanced environment.  
 
 
 
Dara Murphy T.D. 
Minister for European Affairs and Data Protection 
Chair of Government Data Forum 
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Executive summary 
Many cities around the world are seeking to become a smart city, using networked, digital 
technologies and urban big data to tackle a range of issues, such as improving governance 
and service delivery, creating more resilient critical infrastructure, growing the local 
economy, becoming more sustainable, producing better mobility, gaining transparency and 
accountability, enhancing quality of life, and increasing safety and security. In short, the 
desire is to use digital technology to improve the lives of citizens, finesse city management, 
and create economic development.  
In this context, a wide range of smart city technologies are being deployed within urban 
environments, including city operating systems, centralised control rooms, urban 
dashboards, intelligent transport systems, integrated travel ticketing, bike share schemes, 
real-time passenger information displays, logistics management systems, smart energy 
grids, controllable lighting, smart meters, sensor networks, building management systems, 
and an array of smartphone apps and sharing economy platforms. All of these technologies 
generate huge quantities of data, much of them in real-time and at a highly granular scale.  
These data about cities and their citizens can be put to many good uses and, if shared, for 
uses beyond the system and purposes for which they were generated. Collectively, these 
data create the evidence base to run cities more efficiently, productively, sustainably, 
transparently and fairly. However, generating, processing, analysing, sharing and storing 
large amounts of actionable data also raise a number of concerns and challenges.  
Key amongst these are the data privacy, data protection, and data security issues that arise 
from the creation of smart cities. Many smart city technologies capture personally 
identifiable information (PII) and household level data about citizens – their characteristics, 
their location and movements, and their activities – link these data together to produce new 
derived data, and use them to create profiles of people and places and to make decisions 
about them. As such, there are concerns about what a smart city means for people’s privacy 
and what privacy harms might arise from the sharing, analysis and misuse of urban big data. 
In addition, there are questions as to how secure smart city technologies and the data they 
generate are from hacking and theft and what the implications of a data breach are for 
citizens. While successful cyberattacks on cities are still relatively rare, it is clear that smart 
city technologies raise a number of cybersecurity concerns that require attention.  
To date, the approach to these issues has been haphazard and uncoordinated due to the ad-
hoc manner in which they were developed. However, given the potential harms to citizens 
and the associated costs that can arise, and the potential benefits at stake, this approach 
should not be allowed to continue. The challenge is to rollout smart city solutions and gain 
the benefits of their deployment while maintaining infrastructure and system security and 
systematically minimising any pernicious effects and harms. This is no easy task, given the 
many stakeholders and vested interests involved and their differing aims and ambitions, and 
the diverse set of technologies and their complex arrangement. 
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This report details the development of smart cities and urban big data, highlights the various 
privacy and security concerns and harms related to the deployment and use of smart city 
technologies and initiatives, and makes a number of suggestions for addressing trepidations 
about and ills arising from data privacy, protection and security issues.  
It argues that there is no single solution for ensuring that the benefits of creating smart 
cities are realised and any negative effects are neutralised. Rather, it advocates a multi-
pronged approach that uses a suite of solutions, some of which are market driven, some 
more technical in nature (privacy enhancement technologies), others more policy, 
regulatory and legally focused (revised fair information practice principles, privacy by 
design, security by design, education and training), and some more governance and 
management orientated (at three levels: vision and strategy – smart city advisory board and 
smart city strategy; oversight of delivery and compliance – smart city governance, ethics and 
security oversight committee; and day-to-day delivery – core privacy/security team, smart 
city privacy/security assessments, and computer emergency response team).  
These solutions provide a balanced, pragmatic approach that enable the rollout of smart city 
technologies and initiatives, but in a way that is not prejudicial to people’s privacy, actively 
work to minimise privacy harms, curtail data breaches, and tackle cybersecurity issues. They 
also work across the entire life-cycle (from procurement to decommissioning) and span the 
whole system ecology (all its stakeholders and components). Collectively they promote 
fairness and equity, protect citizens and cities from harms, and enable improved governance 
and economic development. Moreover, they do so using an approach that is not heavy 
handed in nature and is relatively inexpensive to implement. They are by no means 
definitive, but build on and extend work to date, advance the debate, and detail a practical 
route forward.  
The report concludes that a core requirement for creating smart cities is the adoption of an 
ethical, principle-led approach designed to best serve the interests of citizens. In other 
words, being smart about how we plan and run cities consists of much more than deploying 
data-driven, networked technologies; it requires a smart approach. 
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1. Smart cities  
In recent years, many cities have declared their intention to become ‘smart cities’, initiating 
smart city programmes and deploying smart city technologies. A plethora of companies 
have begun to market smart city solutions. They have been joined by a range of 
governmental and supra-national initiatives and funding programmes, industry think-tanks 
and lobby groups, non-governmental organisations and university research centres, focused 
on promoting and developing smart cities. Yet, as with many technology-related buzz 
phrases, the term ‘smart city’ lacks a well delineated and agreed upon definition.  
A review of the academic, stakeholder and corporate literature reveals that a smart city is 
comprehended in three broad ways. In each case, the vision is building upon earlier 
initiatives and technological deployments which have been in progress from the early 1970s 
(e.g., cybernetic cities, wired cities, cyber cities, digital cities, knowledge cities, intelligent 
cities, innovation cities) and overlap with other popular, current city framings (e.g., resilient 
cities, sustainable cities, safe cities, eco-cities).1 
First, there is a constituency that understands smart cities to be principally about digitally 
instrumenting cities to change how urban infrastructures and city services are configured 
and managed. In this vision, the city is increasingly composed of networked, digitally-
enabled devices directly embedded into the fabric of cities (e.g., digital CCTV, smart meters, 
transponders, sensor networks, software-controlled equipment, etc.) that produce 
continuous streams of data that dynamically feed into management software and control 
rooms enabling the real-time regulation of city systems (e.g., transport management, 
energy supply, emergency services; see Table 1).2 These are supplemented by new media 
such as smartphone apps that both present and generate a range of information about the 
city and its citizens. These data-driven, networked technologies work to make cities 
knowable and controllable in new, dynamic, reactive ways through the use of vast 
quantities of real-time data and interactive, programmable systems.3 Moreover, the data 
generated can be used to create and improve models and simulations to guide future urban 
development.4  
Second, there are some who conceive of the smart city as an initiative principally concerned 
with improving urban policy, development and governance by using advances in ICT to 
reconfigure human capital, creativity, innovation, education, participation, sustainability, 
and management.5 Here, it is envisioned that the strategic use of ICT produces smarter 
citizens, workers and public servants that in turn can enact smarter policy and programmes, 
produce better products, foster indigenous entrepreneurship and attract inward 
investment. A smart city is thus one that utilises e-government, publishes open data and 
fosters an open data economy, creates citizen-centric dashboards about city performance, 
encourages citizen participation in reporting issues and planning, enables urban test-
bedding (wherein companies can trial new technologies aimed at improving urban services), 
actively nurtures start-up companies and accelerator programmes, promotes the use of ICT 
in education programmes, and actively leverages the technologies and data detailed in 
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Table 1 to create new synergies, especially cross-sectoral approaches that break down 
departmental silos.  
Table 1: Smart city technologies 
Domain Example technologies 
Government E-government systems; online transactions; city operating 
systems; performance management systems; urban dashboards 
Security and emergency 
services 
Centralised control rooms; digital surveillance; predictive policing; 
coordinated emergency response  
Transport Intelligent transport systems; integrated ticketing; smart travel 
cards; bikeshare; real-time passenger information; smart parking; 
logistics management; transport apps 
Energy Smart grids; smart meters; energy usage apps; smart lighting 
Waste Compactor bins and dynamic routing/collection 
Environment Sensor networks (e.g., pollution, noise, weather; land movement; 
flood management) 
Buildings Building management systems; sensor networks 
Homes Smart meters; app controlled smart appliances  
 
A third conception of a smart city is one that uses digital technologies and ICT to promote a 
citizen-centric model of urban development and management that promotes social 
innovation and social justice, civic engagement and hactivism, and transparent and 
accountable governance.6 A smart city thus promotes a smart society that provides equal 
opportunities, serves local communities, and reduces inequalities. Here, there is an 
emphasis on fostering civic hacking and hackathons; participatory planning and community 
development; open source platforms, software and data; freedom of information; crowd 
sourcing and communal action; and digital and data literacy. This conception of a smart city 
is forwarded as either a counter-weight to the first two, or as an alternative. 
For many stakeholders, these three conceptions of a smart city are not mutually exclusive, 
with smart city strategies seeking to blend elements from all three in varying proportions 
and with different priorities. Indeed, it is important to recognise that the underlying visions, 
ambitions and drivers of smart cities vary between places.7 For example, in Europe/US the 
development of smart cities is principally concerned with improving the efficiency of city 
services, creating resilience and sustainability, strengthening security and control, and 
fostering economic development. In China, India and Africa, smart city initiatives are 
promoted as a way of enabling modernisation and national development, responding to 
population growth/migration, and managing economic and urban transitions. Within these 
broad geographic areas, there is considerable variation depending on the priorities of city 
governments and administrations, and the influence of local culture, history, politics and 
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economies. Moreover, while most smart city initiatives are concerned with retro-fitting 
existing cities, some cities or new city districts are being created from scratch as smart cities 
(e.g., Songdo in South Korea, Masdar in the United Arab Emirates, and a large number of the 
100 planned smart cities in India).  
Despite variations in smart city visions and deployments, each is united through an 
expectation that data-driven, networked technologies can be used to reconfigure how 
aspects of daily life are performed for the better and to tackle pressing urban issues, 
producing a:  
 smart economy by fostering entrepreneurship, innovation, productivity, and 
competiveness;  
 smart government by enabling new forms of e-government, new modes of operational 
governance, improved models and simulations to guide future development, evidence-
informed decision making, better service delivery, and making government more 
transparent, participatory and accountable;  
 smart mobility by creating intelligent transport systems and efficient, inter-operable 
multi-modal public transport;  
 smart environments by promoting sustainability and resilience and the development of 
green energy;  
 smart living by improving quality of life, increasing safety and security, and reducing 
risk; and 
 smart people by creating a more informed citizenry and fostering creativity, inclusivity, 
empowerment and participation.8  
In short, producing smart cities promises to solve a fundamental conundrum of cities – how 
to reduce costs and create economic growth and resilience at the same time as producing 
sustainability and improving services, and increasing participation and quality of life – and to 
do so in commonsensical, pragmatic, neutral and apolitical ways through the use of data-
driven, networked solutions.9  
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2. Irish cities as smart cities 
The four principal Irish cities – Dublin, Cork, Galway and Limerick – have all deployed smart 
city technologies, though they vary in the scale of rollout and the extent to which they are 
coordinated through a smart city vision. Dublin and Cork have most enthusiastically 
embraced the notion of becoming smart cities and both have smart city strategies: Smart 
Dublin (www.smartdublin.ie) and Cork Smart Gateway (www.corksmartgateway.ie/). In both 
cases, the vision of smart cities is a mix of data-driven, networked infrastructure, fostering 
economic growth and entrepreneurship, and citizen-centric initiatives, with a particular 
focus on creating more efficient city services, improved transportation flows, tackling 
flooding, attracting inward investment and encouraging indigenous start-ups and SMEs, and 
open data and civic engagement. Initiatives concerning security and policing, which are 
more prominent in UK and US cities where terrorism is seen as more of a threat, are less of 
a priority.  
In the case of Irish cities, all initiatives are building on top of legacy infrastructure and many 
decades of social and economic programmes, rather than creating new, from the ground-up 
smart city districts. As such, smart city initiatives and technologies have to be layered on top 
of long standing systems and schemes, and be accommodated within or replace existing 
organisational structures. Nonetheless, an audit of the four Dublin local authorities (Dublin 
City Council, Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council, South Dublin County Council, Fingal 
County Council) and the two Cork local authorities (Cork City Council, Cork County Council) 
reveals a relatively large number of mainstreamed smart city initiatives (see Tables 2 and 3). 
In the case of Dublin, there is a whole raft of smart city apps available, some 
provided/commissioned by local authorities (e.g., Art Trax, Heritage Walks, Mindmindr), 
others developed by citizens and commercial enterprises (e.g., Hit the Road, Parkya, Walk 
Dublin10) beyond the initiatives detailed in Table 2. Moreover, there is a range of on-going 
research and pilot projects that have yet to be mainstreamed, and others that ran for a 
handful of years before terminating. Further, beyond the economic development 
organisations listed in Table 2, there is a fairly well developed ecosystem of ‘university-
industry-local government’ smart city research centres and collaborations (including ‘The 
Programmable City’ (implications of creating smart cities), ‘Innovation Value Institute’ 
(business models for smart city technologies), ‘Insight’ (data analytics for smart cities), 
‘CONNECT’ (networking and comms for smart cities), ‘Future Cities’ (sensor, communication 
and analytical technological solutions for sustainability), ‘Dublin Energy Lab’ (smart grids and 
meters)) and some industry centres (e.g., IBM’s smart city global research team) and test-
beds (especially relating to the Internet of Things). Organisations such as Codema and 
Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) undertake smart energy/grid projects and 
provide advice and guidance. In other words, Dublin can lay claim to being a nascent smart 
city, rather than simply trying to become one. 
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Table 2: Smart Dublin  
Smart 
economy 
 
Dublinked Provides access to city datasets, including to some real-time 
data feeds 
Digital Hub Cluster of digital content and technology enterprises; provides 
space, infrastructure and support services for digital tech 
companies 
Startup 
Commissioner 
Advocates for tech start-ups; organises events and support 
schemes 
NDRC Provides supports and capital investment for start-ups; 
runs/sponsors hackathons 
Greenway Cleantech cluster supporting and developing the green 
economy 
Smart 
government 
Fix-your-street A website and app for reporting issues (e.g., vandalism, 
dumping, potholes) to local authorities 
Public realm 
operations map 
An interactive map that reports where and how local authority 
funds are spent  
CRM workflow Customer relations management system used to interface with 
the public and undertake workflow planning 
Library digital 
services 
A suite of library apps for various services 
Intelligent 
transport system  
A suite of different technologies including SCATS (transduction 
loops at junctions), CCTV, ANPR (automatic number plate 
recognition cameras), detection of breaking red lights at Luas 
(tram) lines, feeding into a centralised traffic control room 
Eflow road tolling Automated roll tolling/billing using transponders 
Fleet 
management 
GPS tracking of local authority fleets and route optimisation 
Smart living Street CCTV Network of digital interactive CCTV cameras (alter 
direction/zoom) 
Community CCTV  Network of CCTV in public places (e.g., parks); provides SMS 
alerts; can communicate through speakers in lampposts 
Sonitus sound 
sensing 
Network of sound sensors monitoring noise levels 
Monitored 
sheltered housing 
Remote monitoring of movement sensors and panic buttons in 
sheltered homes 
Smart Stadium Sensor network monitoring different facets of stadium use 
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Smart 
mobility 
 
Leapcard  Smart card access/payment for trains, buses and trams. 
Real-time 
passenger 
information 
Digital displays at bus and tram stops and train stations 
providing information on the arrival/departure time of services 
Smart parking Transponder payment system; park-by-text; display around city; 
API feed 
Information 
display signs 
Traffic (crash/delay) alerts; speeding display signs 
Bliptracker 
displays 
Bike counters; car parking spaces counters; airport queue 
counters 
Dublin Bikes Public hire bike scheme 
Smart 
environment 
 
Sensor flood 
monitoring 
Use of sensor network to monitor river levels by the 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and local authorities 
Pollution 
monitoring 
EPA network of pollution sensors  
Public building 
energy use 
Real-time monitoring of energy use with local authority 
buildings; publicly displayed on screens 
Big Belly Bins Networked compactor bins that use sensors to monitor waste 
levels; waste collection route optimisation 
Smart 
people 
 
DublinDashboard Comprehensive set of interactive graphs and maps of city data, 
including real-time data, as well location-based services 
Fingal Open Data Local authority open data sets 
Map Alerter Real-time alerts of weather and flooding 
CIVIQ Consultation and deliberation tool for planning and 
development 
Citizenspace Consultation and deliberation tool for planning and 
development 
Tog Civic hacking maker meetups 
Code for Ireland Civic hacking coding meetups 
Source: Coletta, Heaphy and Kitchin (2015); only includes operational, rolled-out initiatives procured or co-
developed by local authorities 
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Likewise, in Cork a ‘smart agenda’ is being developed that builds on the existing assets, 
attributes and experiences in the region through the ‘Cork Smart Gateway’ initiative, which 
is a collaboration between the two local authorities and the Nimbus Research Centre 
(Internet of Things, networks) and Tyndall National Institute (ICT, microelectronic circuits, 
nanotechnology, energy, photonics). The aim is to leverage a quadruple helix innovation 
model where government, industry, academia and civil participants work together to co-
create and drive structural change utilising ICT solutions. As well as a host of EU, SFI and 
enterprise projects, Cork is also home to the National Sustainable Building Energy Testbed, 
Water Systems and Service and Innovation Centre, and the Mallow Systems and Innovation 
Centre, and UCC is a lead partner of Insight and CONNECT.  
In addition to these projects, Cork City Council is a follower City in a Smart Cities and 
Communities Horizon 2020 project called GrowSmarter, a €25m initiative (lead cities: 
Stockholm, Cologne, and Barcelona). GrowSmarter establishes three ‘lighthouses’ for smart 
cities which demonstrate to other cities how they can be prepared in an intelligent way for 
the energy challenges of the future. As part of this project, Cork will roll out initiatives in 
transport, energy, and information and communications technology. There are also a 
significant number of companies driving Internet of Things development in the region, for 
example, EMC and Vodafone have jointly invested €2m in a new INFINITE internet of things 
industrial platform that will traverse Cork.  
Table 3: Smart Cork 
Smart 
economy 
Energy Cork Cluster supporting collaboration and innovation in the energy 
sector 
IT@Cork Cluster supporting collaboration and innovation in the ICT 
sector 
TEC Gateway – 
part of Nimbus, CIT 
EI funded technology gateway supporting Irish industry to 
develop new IoT technologies 
Rubicon Incubator – provides supports and capital investment for 
startups 
Smart 
government 
City Council 
housing stock 
management 
Stock condition surveys and maintenance activities updated 
by smart technologies close to real time 
Library digital 
services 
A suite of library apps for various services 
Variable messaging 
signs 
Real time off-street parking and road closure information on 
key access routes to the city 
Smart living Smart energy 
management  
Real-time monitoring and control of energy use and 
environmental characteristics for residential and commercial 
buildings; Secure management and prognostics networks for 
energy systems – EOS 
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Smart urban 
district energy 
Management  
Real-time monitoring and control of neighbourhoods (blocks 
of buildings) for sustainable energy use 
Smart lighting Intelligent LED lighting networks 
GreenCom Smart microgrid testbed that enables wireless 
monitoring/control of loads, microgeneration and 
microstorage energy elements  
Smart 
mobility 
Coca Cola Zero 
Bikes 
Public Hire Bike Scheme 
LeapCard Smart card access/payment for trains and buses 
Real-time 
passenger 
information 
Real time bus and train information at stops 
EV Infrastructure Deploy standard and fast charging points throughout the city 
Smart 
environment 
Smart testbeds National Sustainable Energy Testbed (NSBET); Community 
Testbed - A regional community testbed with access to high-
performance broadband facilities; Water Test-bed 
River Lee 
deployment 
Real time wireless sensor river monitoring system looking at 
water quality and depth 
Rainwater 
harvesting 
Remote monitoring of rainwater harvesting system in Sunview 
Fairhill 
Smart water Sensor development and integration to support management 
of Fats, oils and greases in the waste water networks – 
FOGMON 
Aquametrics – Single point monitoring of water networks 
Mid-altitude 
security and 
environmental 
monitoring 
AEOLUS – Mid-altitude (400m) sensor platform combining HD 
cameras, metrological, Radar and AIS for coastal monitoring 
for security and environmental assessment 
Smart 
people 
Maker Dojo Hands-on, ‘hacker’ style workshops 
CorkCitiEngage A Cork Smart Gateway Survey Project. Public feedback on 
public issues, digital skills, and use of public infrastructure 
CorkOpenData data.corkcity.ie – An online platform for publishing city 
information obtained from various sources, from sensors to 
surveys 
Source: Compiled by the Cork Smart Gateway  
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3. Urban big data and open data 
Central to the creation of smart cities is the generating, processing, analysing and sharing of 
vast quantities of data about city infrastructure, services, and citizens. Indeed, smart cities 
technologies are precisely about making cities data-driven: enabling city systems and 
services to be responsive to and act upon data, preferably real-time data.11 It is thus no 
coincidence that the drive to create smart cities dovetails with the unfolding data 
revolution.12 This revolution consists of five main elements:13 
1. the wide scale production of big data: data that are continuously produced, exhaustive 
to a system, fine-scaled, relational, and flexible;  
2. the scaling of traditional small data into data infrastructures (digital repositories), 
enabling datasets to be shared, conjoined and analysed in new ways;  
3. the creation of linked data that seeks to transform the internet into a ‘web of data’, 
enabling all documents to be rendered as data and to be harvested and linked together;  
4. the publishing of open data, making data publicly available and free to use that was 
previously locked inside institutions; 
5. the development of new data analytics that often rely on machine learning techniques 
which can cope with and draw insight from very large datasets (e.g., data mining and 
pattern recognition; data visualisation and visual analytics; statistical analysis; and 
prediction, simulation, and optimisation modelling).  
Nearly all of the technologies listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are data-driven – producing, deriving 
value from, and acting on data. Most are producing urban big data of varying kinds.14 Four 
are explicitly open data infrastructures (CorkOpenData, Dublinked, Fingal Open Data, Dublin 
Dashboard). Many of them have accompanying apps (that further leverage the data and 
which can themselves produce further data) and APIs (that enable the data to be accessed 
and repurposed).  
In addition to the big data generated by the initiatives detailed in Tables 2 and 3, a deluge of 
other big and open data are being produced with respect to Dublin, Cork and other cities in 
Ireland and around the world by a range of public and private organisations:  
 utility companies (use of electricity, gas, water, lighting); 
 transport providers (location/movement, traffic flow); 
 mobile phone operators (location/movement, app use, behaviour); 
 travel and accommodation websites (reviews, location/movement, consumption); 
 social media sites (opinions, photos, personal info, location/movement); 
 crowdsourcing and citizen science (maps (e.g., OpenStreetMap), local knowledge (e.g., 
Wikipedia), weather (e.g., Wunderground)); 
 government bodies and public administration (services, performance, surveys); 
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 libraries, museums, broadcasters, archives (history of people, cultures and places); 
 financial institutions and retail chains (consumption, location); 
 private surveillance and security firms (location, behaviour); 
 emergency services (security, crime, policing, response); and 
 home appliances and entertainment systems (behaviour, consumption). 
While much of these data are closed and considered a private asset, some of them are 
shared with third party vendors and some are open (through data infrastructures or APIs). 
All these data can be potentially leveraged to create smart city technologies with respect to 
the six domains set out in column 1 of Tables 2 and 3.  
Smart city initiatives such as urban operating systems (sometime called Urban OS or City OS) 
seek to link together multiple smart city technologies to enable greater coordination of city 
systems. Similarly, urban operating centres and urban dashboards attempt to draw and link 
as much of their data together to provide synoptic city intelligence (see Boxes 1 and 2). The 
abundance of data and new analytics are also helping to create new analytical fields such as 
urban informatics (an informational and human-computer interaction approach to 
examining and communicating urban processes) and urban science (a computational 
modelling and simulation approach to understanding, explaining and predicting city 
processes). 
Box 1: Urban Operations Centre 
The Centro De Operacoes Prefeitura Do Rio is a purpose built urban operations centre. Part of the 
impetus for the centre was to create a command and control hub for managing city operations in the 
lead up to and during three major sporting events: The Confederations Cup; The World Cup; and the 
Olympics. More generally, it was built to aid the city administration in managing and controlling a 
large, diverse, complex city, and in the words of the city mayor, Eduardo Paes, “to knock down silos … 
[between] departments and combine each one’s data to help the whole enterprise.”15 It is operated 
on a twenty four hour basis, seven days a week, and is staffed by 400 professional workers employed 
over three shifts.16 
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The centre draws together data streams from thirty agencies, including traffic and public transport, 
municipal and utility services, emergency services, weather feeds, social media, and information sent 
in by the public via phone, internet and radio. This is complemented by a virtual operations platform 
accessible by mobile devices that enable city officials to log-in from the field to access real-time 
information. For example, police at an accident scene can use the platform to see how many 
ambulances have been dispatched and when, and to upload additional information.17  
In the centre a team of analysts, aided by various data analytics software, process, visualise, analyse 
and monitor the vast deluge of live service data, alongside data aggregated over time and huge 
volumes of public administration data that are released on a more periodic basis. The data are used 
for real-time decision making and problem solving. Moreover, data can be mashed together to 
investigate particular aspects of city life and change over time, and to build predictive models with 
respect to everyday city development and management and disaster situations such as flooding. In 
cases of emergencies, the centre becomes a crisis management centre.18 
Given that the centre is live tracking events across the city it has also become a media centre, used to 
produce live traffic and local news updates. Some of these, along with some of the live data, are 
viewable on the centre’s website.  
Centro De Operacoes Prefeitura Do Rio in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, www.centrodeoperacoes.rio.gov.br 
 
Box 2: Urban Dashboard 
The Dublin Dashboard is an interactive website and portal that provides access to a wide range of 
datasets about the city and a suite of visualisation and analysis tools. It is designed to enable users to 
gain detailed, up-to-date intelligence about the city that aids everyday decision making and fosters 
evidence-informed analysis.  
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The underlying data is drawn together from the four Dublin local authorities, Dublinked, Central 
Statistics Office, Eurostat, and government departments. These data are displayed through hundreds 
of interactive data visualisations. However, no personably identifiable information is displayed. 
The site consists of several modules, each of which contains a number of apps. Users can: 
 examine how Dublin is performing on a number of metrics and compared to other cities and 
regions; 
 see how local authorities spend their budget; 
 view what is happening with transport and the environment in real-time; 
 interact with maps of the Census, crime, live register, companies, housing, and planning;  
 find city services near to them; 
 report issues in their area; and 
 download data to conduct their own analysis or build apps 
The site was designed so that: all available open data about the city, including real-time data, is made 
available; there are no closed elements; it is very easy to use, with users requiring no mapping or 
graphing skills; all the apps are interactive so that users can explore the data; and existing resources 
and apps are used so that there is no duplication of effort. 
Dublin Dashboard, www.dublindashboard.ie 
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4. The perils of smart cities and data-driven urbanism 
The promises of smart cities are alluring and there is no doubt that smart city technologies 
help to create cities that are more efficient, competitive, productive, sustainable, resilient, 
participatory and transparent. That said, the drive to create smart cities also raises a 
number of concerns and risks, which can be classified into eight broad types:19 
1. It typically treats the city as a knowable, rational, steerable machine, rather than a 
complex system full of wicked problems and competing interests;20 
2. It promotes a strong emphasis on creating technical solutions and overly promotes top-
down technocratic forms of governance, rather than political/social solutions and 
citizen-centred deliberative democracy;21 
3. The technological solutions forwarded often treat cities as ahistorical and aspatial and as 
generic markets, promoting one-size fits all technical fixes rather than recognising the 
need for bespoke solutions tailored to city characteristics and needs;22 
4. The technologies deployed are portrayed as being objective, commonsensical, pragmatic 
and politically benign, rather than thoroughly political, reflecting the views and values of 
their developers and stakeholders;23 
5. It promotes the corporatisation and privatisation of city services, with the developers of 
smart city technologies capturing city functions as market opportunities which are run 
for profit rather than the public good, and potentially create propriety technological 
lock-ins;24 
6. It prioritises the values and investments of vested interests, reinforces inequalities, and 
deepens levels of control and regulation, rather than creating a more socially just and 
equal society;25  
7. The technologies deployed have profound social, political and ethical effects: 
introducing new forms of social regulation, control and governance; extending 
surveillance and eroding privacy; and enabling predictive profiling, social sorting and 
behavioural nudging;26 
8. The technologies deployed potentially produce buggy, brittle and hackable urban 
systems which create systemic vulnerabilities across critical infrastructure and 
compromise data security, rather than producing stable, reliable, resilient, secure 
systems.27 
These concerns and risks, and associated debates, are generally little known within wider 
society. As such, we are still very much at the stage of trying to understand and grapple with 
the consequences of producing smart cities and data-driven urbanism, and to create new 
policies, standards, regulations and laws that enable their benefits to be realised whilst 
minimising any pernicious effects.  
The remainder of this report focuses on the latter two concerns and risks: ethical effects and 
security vulnerabilities. The report first discusses the implications of smart city technologies 
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and data-driven urbanism for data privacy, data protection and data security. It then sets 
out various strategies and policies for addressing privacy and protection concerns and 
tackling systemic weaknesses in data security.  
The discussion somewhat inherently casts a negative light on smart city initiatives by 
highlighting potential privacy and security harms. Such critical analysis is important because, 
while the development of smart cities undoubtedly has created and will continue to create 
many benefits, they also raise a number of troubling issues that need to be fully considered. 
It is only by reflecting on and addressing these issues that we will develop smart cities that 
serve all parties (citizens, city authorities and companies) and deliver on their promises, 
while minimising their pernicious effects and addressing their weaknesses.  
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5. Smart cities and data privacy and protection concerns 
5.1 Privacy and privacy harms 
Privacy – to selectively reveal oneself to the world28 – is a condition that many people value 
and it is considered a basic human right in most jurisdictions, enshrined in national and 
supra-national laws in various ways. How privacy is understood both as an everyday and 
legal concept, however, varies between cultures and contexts. In general terms, privacy 
debates concern acceptable practices with regards to accessing and disclosing personal and 
sensitive information about a person.29 Such sensitive information can relate to a number of 
a personal facets and domains creating a number of inter-related privacy forms including:  
 identity privacy (to protect personal and confidential data); 
 bodily privacy (to protect the integrity of the physical person);  
 territorial privacy (to protect personal space, objects and property);  
 locational and movement privacy (to protect against the tracking of spatial behaviour); 
 communications privacy (to protect against the surveillance of conversations and 
correspondence); and 
 transactions privacy (to protect against monitoring of queries/searches, purchases, and 
other exchanges).30  
As Daniel Solove31 details, these forms of privacy can be threatened and breached through a 
number of what are normally understood as unacceptable practices, each of which 
produces a different form of harm (see Table 4).  
Table 4: A taxonomy of privacy breaches and harms  
Domain Privacy breach Description 
Information 
collection  
 
Surveillance Watching, listening to, or recording of an individual’s 
activities 
Interrogation Various forms of questioning or probing for information 
Information 
processing 
Aggregation The combination of various pieces of data about a person 
Identification Linking information to particular individuals 
Insecurity Carelessness in protecting stored information from leaks 
and improper access 
Secondary use Use of information collected for one purpose for a 
different purpose without the data subject’s consent 
Exclusion Failure to allow the data subject to know about the data 
that others have about her and participate in its handling 
and use, including being barred from being able to access 
and correct errors in that data 
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Domain Privacy breach Description 
Information 
dissemination 
Breach of 
confidentiality 
Breaking a promise to keep a person’s information 
confidential 
Disclosure Revelation of information about a person that impacts the 
way others judge her character 
Exposure Revealing another’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions 
Increased 
accessibility 
Amplifying the accessibility of information 
Blackmail Threat to disclose personal information 
Appropriation The use of the data subject’s identity to serve the aims 
and interests of another 
Distortion Dissemination of false or misleading information about 
individuals 
Invasion Intrusion Invasive acts that disturb one’s tranquillity or solitude 
Decisional 
interference  
Incursion into the data subject’s decisions regarding her 
private affairs 
Source: compiled from Solove (2006) 
5.2 Current approach to privacy breaches/harms  
From a legal perspective, privacy breaches and harms are mostly covered under the rubric 
of privacy laws in the United States, whereas in the European Union it falls within the realm 
of data protection.32 In both cases, the legal frameworks draw on fair information practice 
principles (FIPPs) that are largely constructed around personal rights regarding the 
generation, use, and disclosure of personal data and the obligations of data controllers with 
respect to these rights33 (see Table 5). However, different emphasis is placed on these FIPPs. 
For example, while the OECD34 set out eight FIPPs (see Table 5), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in the United States advocates just four of them (notice, consent, access 
and security).35 While the EU legislation is universal across all domains (e.g., health, finance, 
etc.) and applies equally to all data controllers, privacy laws are mostly domain specific in 
the U.S.36 Moreover, while there is common ground on how to address privacy harms, such 
as advocating privacy by design, enhanced data security, and access rights to check and 
correct data, there are differences in approach and how to implement them (in terms of 
obtaining consent, notification of data breaches, cross-border data flows).37 Other 
jurisdictions have their own approaches.38  
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Table 5: Fair Information Practice Principles 
General principle General description Original OECD principle and description 
Notice Individuals are 
informed that data 
are being generated 
and the purpose to 
which the data will 
be put. 
Purpose Specification Principle. The purposes for which 
personal data are collected should be specified not later 
than at the time of data collection and the subsequent 
use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such 
others as are not incompatible with those purposes and 
as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose. 
Choice Individuals have the 
choice to opt-in or 
opt-out as to 
whether and how 
their data will be 
used or disclosed. 
Openness Principle. There should be a general policy of 
openness about developments, practices and policies 
with respect to personal data. Means should be readily 
available of establishing the existence and nature of 
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as 
well as the identity and usual residence of the data 
controller. 
Consent Data are only 
generated and 
disclosed with the 
consent of 
individuals. 
Collection Limitation Principle. There should be limits to 
the collection of personal data and any such data 
should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data 
subject. 
Security Data are protected 
from loss, misuse, 
unauthorised access, 
disclosure, alteration 
and destruction. 
Security Safeguards Principle. Personal data should be 
protected by reasonable security safeguards against 
such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of data. 
Integrity Data are reliable, 
accurate, complete 
and current. 
Data Quality Principle. Personal data should be relevant 
to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to 
the extent necessary for those purposes, should be 
accurate, complete and kept up-to-date. 
Access Individuals can 
access, check and 
verify data about 
themselves. 
Individual Participation Principle. An individual should 
have the right: 
(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, 
confirmation of whether or not the data controller 
has data relating to her/him; 
(b) to have communicated to her/him, data relating to 
her/him within a reasonable time; at a charge, if 
any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; 
and in a form that is readily intelligible to her/him; 
(c) to be given reasons if a request made under 
subparagraphs(a) and (b) is denied, and to be able 
to challenge such denial; and 
(d) to challenge data relating to her/him and, if the 
challenge is successful to have the data erased, 
rectified, completed or amended. 
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General principle General description Original OECD principle and description 
Use Data are only used 
for the purpose for 
which they are 
generated and 
individuals are 
informed of each 
change of purpose. 
Use Limitation Principle. Personal data should not be 
disclosed, made available or otherwise used for 
purposes other than those specified within the notice, 
except: with the consent of the data subject, or by the 
authority of law. 
Accountability The data holder is 
accountable for 
ensuring the above 
principles and has 
mechanisms in place 
to assure 
compliance. 
Accountability Principle. A data controller should be 
accountable for complying with measures which give 
effect to the principles stated above. 
Sources: Minelli et al. (2013); OECD (1980) 
The varying legal framings and policies across jurisdictions create a fractured regulatory and 
compliance landscape, with different obligations existing for smart city technologies 
deployed within different nations (and cities depending on local laws and regulation). 
Nonetheless, putting this issue to one side, it is clear that across all jurisdictions smart city 
technologies are challenging existing legal and regulatory provisions, as well as societal 
norms and expectations, with respect to privacy (see Box 3).  
Box 3: Privacy concerns with respect to smartphone apps 
In 2015 two thirds of adults in the United States owned a smartphone (with 85% penetration 
amongst 18-29 year olds).39 On average, smartphone users spent 30 hours each month using about 
27 apps.40 Many smart city technologies are accompanied by a dedicated smartphone app or third 
party apps utilising their APIs. The smartphone is thus a key technology through which citizens 
interface with and experience the smart city. As well as communicating information derived from 
smart city technologies, smartphones also generate significant amounts of data that, on the one 
hand, can feed back into smart city initiatives and, on the other, raise many privacy and security 
concerns.  
With respect to privacy, Zang et al.,41 note that there are four key worries with respect to 
smartphone apps: 
First, each smartphone has unique identifiers that can be accessed and shared by apps, some of 
which can be captured externally via wifi or bluetooth signal. These identifiers include System ID, 
SIM card ID, IMEI (International Mobile Station Equipment Identity), MEID (Mobile Equipment 
Identifier), MAC address (Media Access Control), and UDID (Unique Device Identifier).42 These IDs 
can be used to track the phone and, by association, its owner. Although the IDs are pseudonyms, 
they act as very clear personal markers that have a range of other information attached to them, 
such as phone numbers, email accounts, messaging logs, address books, social media accounts, 
credit card details, etc., as well as inferred information such as home and work addresses (through 
repeated visits and time spent at the locations). 
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Second, an app can request permission to access device functions, such as the camera, phone, 
stored media, as well personal or sensitive data such as addresses and passwords. A common worry 
is that many apps practice over-privileging, seeking permission to access more data and device 
functions than they need for their operation.43 For example, Table 6 details the data permissions 
that can be sought by Android apps. 
Table 6: Data permissions that can be sought by Android apps 
Data type  Data permissions sought 
Accounts log email log 
App Activity  name, package name, process number of activity, processed id 
App Data Usage Cache size, code size, data size, name, package name 
App Install  installed at, name, package name, unknown sources enabled, 
version code, version name 
Battery health, level, plugged, present, scale, status, technology, 
temperature, voltage 
Device Info board, brand, build version, cell number, device, device type, 
display, fingerprint, IP, MAC address, manufacturer, model, OS 
platform, product, SDK code, total disk space, unknown sources 
enabled 
GPS  accuracy, altitude, latitude, longitude, provider, speed 
MMS  from number, MMS at, MMS type, service number, to number 
NetData  bytes received, bytes sent, connection type, interface type 
PhoneCall  call duration, called at, from number, phone call type, to number 
SMS from number, service number, SMS at, SMS type, to number 
TelephonyInfo cell tower ID, cell tower latitude, cell tower longitude, IMEI, ISO 
country code, local area code, MEID, mobile country code, mobile 
network code, network name, network type, phone type, SIM 
serial number, SIM state, subscriber ID 
WifiConnection BSSID, IP, linkspeed, MAC addr, network ID, RSSI, SSID 
WifiNeighbors BSSID, capabilities, frequency, level, SSID 
Root Check root status code, root status reason code, root version, sig file 
version 
Malware Info  algorithm confidence, app list, found malware, malware SDK 
version, package list, reason code, service list, sigfile version 
Source: Hein (2014) 
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Some of the data hoovered up by an app seeking these permissions, as well as device access, will be 
vital for an app to work. However, such wide ranging permissions clearly do not comply with the 
ethos of data minimisation, nor is it in the best interest of the app user. It may well be the case 
while permission is sought that an app does not actually access or pulldown all these data, in which 
case the question remains as to why excessive permissions are sought in the first place.  
Third, any data collected by an app can potentially be shared with third parties, such as advertisers. 
In a test of 101 smartphone apps in 2011, the Wall Street Journal found that 56 transmitted the 
phone’s unique device identifier to other companies without users’ awareness or consent, 47 sent 
the phone’s location, and 5 sent the user’s personal details.44 A similar 2015 study of 110 popular 
Android and iOS apps found that 73% of Android apps shared personal information such as email 
address with third parties, and 47% of iOS apps shared geo-coordinates and other location data with 
third parties.45  
Fourth, terms and conditions with respect to apps, including privacy, can be difficult to understand 
given their use of legal language, length, complexity, use of vague, elastic terms like ‘improving 
customer experience’, and declarations about changing future terms unilaterally.46 Moreover, 
configuring the privacy tools within the device settings is not always intuitive to non-technical users. 
Even more troubling is that a large number of apps do not have privacy policies that users can view 
and accept. For example, the European Data Protection Supervisor reported in 2014 that 39% of the 
most popular apps had no privacy policy.47 Likewise, a comparison of 110 apps in 2015 found that 
33% of the iOS apps and 25% of the Android apps had no privacy policies.48 Given that there are 
over 1.5 million apps in the Apple App Store and 1.6 million in the Google Play Store, a very large 
number of apps lack privacy policies.49 
5.3 Smart cities, privacy harms and challenges to existing regulatory 
approaches 
Smart city technologies create a number of potential privacy harms for six inter-related 
reasons, each of which also raises significant challenges to existing approaches to protecting 
privacy. As a number of studies have highlighted, these issues are of significant concern to 
the general public, civil liberties organisations, legislators and regulators,50 and have been 
the focus of public campaigns against smart city technologies in some cases.51 
5.3.1 Intensifies datafication 
Smart city technologies capture data relating to all forms of privacy and radically expand the 
volume, range and granularity of the data being generated about people and places.52 
Importantly, the capture and circulation of these data are:  
1. indiscriminate and exhaustive (involve all individuals, objects, transactions, etc.);  
2. distributed (occur across multiple devices, services and places);  
3. platform independent (data flows easily across platforms, services, and devices);  
4. continuous (data are generated on a routine and automated basis).53  
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Further, tasks that were previously unmonitored or potentially captured only through a 
disciplinary gaze, such as what television programmes one watches or the settings of a 
home heating thermostat or journeys across a city, are now routinely tracked and traced 
through smart technologies (see Box 4). The result is the production of detailed longitudinal 
datasets. These datasets are easily shared and can be conjoined to other datasets to extract 
additional insights. Since the data are organised and stored in digital databases, they are 
highly suited to examination using data analytics.54  
Such datafication has four effects with respect to privacy. First, people are now subject to 
much greater levels of intensified scrutiny and modes of surveillance and dataveillance than 
ever before55, with smart city technologies providing deeply personal pictures of individual 
lives, especially when datasets are combined together.56 Second, the pervasiveness of 
digitally-mediated transactions and surveillance, plus the increasing use of unique identifiers 
and PII to access services (e.g., names, usernames, passwords, account numbers, addresses, 
emails, phone details, credit card numbers, smart card ID, license plates, faces), means that 
it is all but impossible to live everyday lives without leaving digital footprints (traces we 
leave ourselves) and shadows (traces captured about us).57 Third, the mass recording, 
organising, storing and sharing of big data about a phenomenon changes the uses to which 
such data can be put, both for good and for ill.58 Fourth, such data enables a lot of inference 
beyond the data generated to reveal insights that have never been disclosed. 
Box 4: Location and movement tracking 
Up until relatively recently tracking the movement of individuals was a slow, labour-intensive, partial 
and difficult process.59 The only way to track the location and movements of an individual were to 
follow them in person and to quiz those with whom they interacted. As a result, people’s movement 
was undocumented unless there was a specific reason to focus on them through the deployment of 
costly resources. Even if a person was tracked, the records tended to be partial, bulky, difficult to 
cross-tabulate, aggregate and analyse, and expensive to store.  
A range of smart technologies has transformed geo-location tracking to a situation where the 
monitoring of location is pervasive, continuous, automatic and relatively cheap, it is straightforward 
to process and store data, and easy to build up travel profiles and histories. For example:  
 Many cities are saturated with remote controllable digital CCTV cameras that can zoom, move 
and track individual pedestrians. In addition, large parts of the road network and the movement 
of vehicles are surveyed by traffic, red-light, congestion and toll cameras. Analysis and 
interpretation of CCTV footage is increasingly aided by facial, gait and automatic number plate 
recognition (ANPR) using machine vision algorithms. Several police forces in cities in the UK have 
rolled out CCTV facial recognition programmes,60 as have cities in the U.S., including New York 
and Chicago (each with over 24,000 cameras) and San Diego (who are also using smartphones 
with facial recognition installed).61 ANPR cameras are installed in many cities for monitoring 
traffic flow, but also for administrating traffic violations such as the non-payment of road tolls 
and congestion charging. There are an estimated 8,300 ANPR cameras across the UK capturing 
30 million number plates each day.62 
 Smartphones continuously communicate their location to telecommunications providers, either 
through the cell masts they connect to, or the sending of GPS coordinates, or their connections 
to wifi hotspots. Likewise, smartphone apps can access and transfer such information and also 
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share them to third parties. With respect to the latter, Leszczynski’s analysis of the data 
generated by The Wall Street Journal in 201163 details that 25 out 50 iPhone apps, and 21 of 50 
Android apps transmitted location data to a third party other than the app developer64. These 
data are used to target advertising and utilised by data brokers to create user profiles. For 
example, ‘Verizon have a product called Precision Market Insights that let businesses track cell 
phone users in particular locations.’65  
 In a number of cities, sensor networks have been deployed across street infrastructure such as 
bins and lampposts to capture and track phone identifiers such as MAC addresses. In London, 
Renew installed such sensors on 200 bins, capturing in a single week in 2014 identifiers from 
4,009,676 devices and tracking these as they moved from bin to bin.66 The company reported 
that they could measure the proximity, speed, and manufacturer of a device and track the stores 
individuals visited, how long they stayed there, and how loyal customers are to particular shops, 
using the information to show contextual adverts on LCD screens installed on the bins.67The 
same technology is also used within malls and shops to track shoppers, sometimes linking with 
CCTV to capture basic demographic information such as age and gender.68  
 Similarly, some cities have installed a wifi mesh, either to provide public wifi or to create a 
privileged emergency response and relief communication system in the event of an urban 
disaster or for general surveillance. In the case of public wifi, the IDs of the devices which access 
the network are captured and can be tracked between wifi points. In the case of an 
emergency/police mesh, access might not be granted to the network; however each network 
access point can capture the device IDs, device type, apps installed, as well as the locational 
history.69 Such a wifi mesh, with 160 nodes, was installed by the Seattle Police Department in 
2013.70 The locational history of previous wifi access points is revealed because a wifi-enabled 
device broadcasts the name of every network it has connected to previously in order to try and 
find one it can connect to automatically. Beyond a wifi-mesh, anyone with a wi-fi adapter in 
monitor mode and a packet capture utility can capture such data.71 
 Many buildings use smart card tracking, with unique identifiers installed either through barcodes 
or embedded RFID chips. Cards are used for access control to different parts of the building and 
to register attendance, but can also be used as an electronic purse to pay for items within the 
facility. Smart card tracking is becoming increasingly common in many schools to track and trace 
student movements, activities and food consumption.72 Smart cards are also used to access and 
pay for public transport, such as the Leapcard in Dublin or the Oyster Card in London. Each 
reading of the card adds to the database of movement within a campus or across a city. 
 New vehicles are routinely fitted with GPS that enables the on-board computers to track 
location, movement, and speed. These devices can be passive and store data locally to be 
downloaded for analysis at a later point, or be active, communicating in real-time via cellular or 
satellite networks to another device or data centre. Active GPS tracking is commonly used in 
fleet management to track goods vehicles, public transport and hire cars, or to monitor cars on a 
payment plan to ensure that it can be traced and recovered in cases of default, or in private cars 
as a means of theft recovery. Moreover, cars are increasingly being fitted with unique ID 
transponders that are used for the automated operation and payment of road tolls and car 
parking. Again, each use of the transponder is logged, creating a movement data trail, though 
with a larger spatial and temporal granularity (at selected locations). 
 Selected populations — such as people on probation, prisoners on home leave, people with 
dementia, children — are being electronically tagged to enable tracking. Typically this is done 
using a GPS-enabled bracelet that periodically transmits location and status information via a 
wireless telephone network to a monitoring system. In other cases, it is possible to install tracker 
apps onto a phone (of say children) so the phone location can be tracked, or to buy a family 
tracking service from telecoms providers.73 
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 There are also many other staging points where we might leave an occasional trace of our 
movement and activities, such as using ATMs, or using a credit card in a store, or checking a 
book out of a library. Another form of staging point is the use of the Internet, such as browsing 
or sending email, where the IP address of the computer reveals the approximate location from 
which it is connected. Typically this does not have a fine spatial resolution (mile to city or region 
scale), but does show sizable shifts of location between places. Another set of staging points can 
be revealed from the geotagging (using the device GPS) and time/date stamping of photos and 
social media posted on the internet and recorded in their associated metadata. This has more 
spatial resolution than IP addresses and is also accompanied with other contextual information 
such as the content of the photo/post.74 
 Location and movement can also be voluntarily shared by individuals through online calenders, 
most of which are private but nonetheless stored in the cloud with a service provider, and some 
of which are shared openly or with colleagues. 
As these examples demonstrate, those companies and agencies who run these technologies possess 
a vast quantity of highly detailed spatial behaviour data from which lots of other insights can be 
inferred (such as mode of travel, activity, and lifestyle). Moreover, these data can be accessed by the 
police and security forces through warrants or more surreptitiously, and can be shared with third 
party partners for commercial purposes. The consequence is that individuals are no longer lost in the 
crowd, but rather they are being tracked and traced at different scales of spatial and temporal 
resolution, and are increasingly becoming open to geo-targeted profiling for advertising and social 
sorting. 
5.3.2 Deepens inferencing and creates predictive privacy harms  
Predictive modelling using urban big data can generate inferences about an individual that 
are not directly encoded in a database but constitute what many would consider to be PII 
and which produce ‘predictive privacy harms.’75 For example, co-proximity and co-
movement with others can be used to infer political, social, and/or religious affiliation, 
potentially revealing membership of particular groups.76 Likewise, the volunteered 
information of a few people on social media can unlock the same undisclosed information 
about the many through social network analysis and pattern recognition, creating what 
Barocas and Nissenbaum77 term the ‘the tyranny of the minority’. It has been calculated 
that knowing the sexual orientation of just twenty percent of social media users will enable 
the orientation of all other users to be inferred with a high degree of accuracy.78  
Similarly, tracking data that reveals a person regularly frequents gay bars, leading to the 
inference that the person is likely to gay, would be considered by many as personal and 
sensitive data, especially in places that are still intolerant of gay relationships. If any 
inference of sexual orientation produced by a predictive model was shared, for example 
through advertising sent to the family home or via social media on a shared computer, then 
it could cause personal harm. Yet, as no data about sexuality has been directly collected, 
Crawford and Schultz79 note that any company or organisation making such inferences has 
‘no obligation under current privacy regimes to give notice to, or gather consent from its 
customers in the same way that direct collection protocols require.’ Moreover, these 
inferences can generate inaccurate characterization that then stick to and precede an 
individual. This is a particular issue in predictive policing and anticipatory governance, where 
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the profiling of both people and places can reinforce or create stigma and harm, particularly 
when the underlying data or models are poor.  
5.3.3 Weak anonymization and enables re-identification 
One of the key strategies for ensuring individual privacy is anonymization, either through 
the use of pseudonyms, aggregation or other strategies. The generation of big data and new 
computational techniques, however, can make the re-identification of data relatively 
straightforward in many cases. Pseudonyms, in particular, simply mean that a unique tag is 
used to identify a person in place of a name. As such, the tag is anonymous in so far that 
code is used to identify an individual. However, the code is persistent and distinguishable 
from others and recognisable on an on-going basis, meaning it can be tracked over time and 
space and used to create detailed individual profiles.80 As such, it is no different from other 
persistent pseudonym identifiers such as social security numbers and in effect constitutes 
PII.81 The term ‘anonymous identifier’, as used by some companies,82 is thus somewhat of 
an oxymoron, especially when the identifier is directly linked to an account with known 
personal details (e.g., name, address, credit card number). Even if the person is not 
immediately identifiable, the persistence of the pseudonym enables data controllers to act 
on that data and shape how they interact with individuals. As such, pseudonyms ‘enable 
holders of large datasets to act on individuals, under the cover of anonymity, in precisely 
the ways anonymity has long promised to defend against’ and they place no inherent limits 
on an institution’s ability to track and trace the same person in subsequent encounters.83  
Further, inference and the linking of a pseudonym to other accounts and transactions 
means it can potentially be re-identified. Indeed, it is clear that it is possible to reverse 
engineer anonymisation strategies by combing and combining datasets84 unless the data are 
fully de-identified. De-identification requires both direct identifiers and quasi-identifiers 
(those highly correlated with unique identifiers) to be carefully removed.85 The extent to 
which this is happening before data are shared with third parties is highly doubtful. 
Moreover, there are some companies that specialise in re-identification of data across big 
data datasets.86 Such is the concern that the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner and the 
New Zealand Data Futures Forum have advocated legal protections against re-
identification.87 
5.3.4 Opacity and automation creates obfuscation and reduces control 
The emerging big data landscape is complex and fragmented. Various smart city 
technologies are composed of multiple interacting systems run by a number of corporate 
and state actors.88 For example, the app ecosystem (including app developers, app owners, 
app stores, operating systems, mobile carriers, devices) is conjoined to the data source 
ecosystem (e.g., an API of real-time bus data), which similarly consists of a range of 
hardware, software and organisations. Data are thus passed between synergistic and 
interoperable ‘devices, platforms, services, applications, and analytics engines’89 and shared 
with third parties. Moreover, across this maze-like assemblage they can be ‘leaked, 
intercepted, transmitted, disclosed, dis/assembled across data streams, and repurposed’ in 
ways that are difficult to track and untangle.90 The result is that it can be very difficult to 
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know precisely the life of data and how they are used and transformed into new derived 
data.91 Nor is it easy to understand the tangled set of roles (as data processors and 
controllers) and obligations between actors and where responsibilities and liabilities 
reside.92  
Adding to the opacity of systems is that the generating, processing, sharing and acting on 
data are increasingly becoming automated. Automation of smart city technologies exists at 
three levels:93  
 human-in-the-loop: systems identify and select profiles and targets, but the system will 
only respond with a human command (e.g., facial recognition matches being manually 
assessed before proceeding); 
 human-on-the-loop: systems identify and select profiles and targets, and can act on 
them but under the oversight of a human operator who can over-ride the system (e.g., 
SCADA systems, or intelligent transport control rooms); and 
 human-out-of-the-loop: the system identifies and selects profiles and targets and acts 
on them without any human input or interaction (e.g., automatically: using ANPR to 
detect congestion charge breaches and issue fines; adding suspects to no-fly lists based 
on data mining; conducting trades on the stock market; purging voters from registration 
lists).94 
Human-out-of-the-loop implements a form of automated management in which decisions 
are automated, automatic and autonomous in nature.95 Within such automated systems, 
the rules for acting on data and making decisions is black-boxed. Yet it is well known that 
programmers routinely, if unintentionally, change the substance of rules when translating 
them into computer code, despite not having the delegated authority to do so.96 Moreover, 
weak algorithms and dirty or error-prone data can generate high rates of false positives and 
baseless decision making. The result is that the ‘transparency, accuracy, and political 
accountability of administrative rulemaking are lost’, policy and law are inadvertently 
distorted, and critical procedural safeguards are potentially dismantled.97 This makes 
external oversight and scrutiny difficult, especially in cases where the system adjudicates in 
secret or lacks audit trails.98 These automated systems can be Kafkaesque; for example, no-
fly lists where people are not informed as to why they have been placed on the list, yet nor 
can they argue against the decision.99 
Opacity and automation undermine the FIPPs at the heart of privacy regulation in a number 
of respects; making it difficult for individuals to seek access to verify, query, correct or 
delete data, or to even know who to ask; to know how data collected about them is used; to 
assess how fair any actions taken upon the data are; and to hold data controllers to 
account.100 Automated systems makes notice and consent all but impossible, since ‘the 
public has no opportunity to review new rules embedded in closed source code’ and 
‘individuals lack notice of the new rules that will bind them.’101 Moreover, meaningful 
judicial review is impaired and technological due process is lacking.102 
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5.3.5 Data are being shared and repurposed and used in unpredictable and unexpected 
ways 
One of the key features of the data revolution is the wholesale erosion of data minimisation 
principles; that is, the undermining of purpose specification and use limitation principles 
that mean that data should only be generated to perform a particular task, are only retained 
as long as they are needed for that task, and are only used to perform a particular task.103 
These principles are largely antithetical to the rationale of big data and the functioning of 
data markets which seek to generate and hoard large volumes of data to extract additional 
value.104 The solution pursued by many companies is to repackage data by de-identifying 
them (using pseudonyms or aggregation) or creating derived data, with only the original 
dataset being subjected to data minimisation. The repackaged data can then be sold on and 
repurposed in a plethora of ways that have little to do with the original reason for data 
generation and without the need to give notice or consent to those that the data 
concerns.105  
Such data practices are now common, enabling the rapid growth of data brokers 
(sometimes called data aggregators or consolidators or resellers) which capture, gather 
together and repackage data into privately held data infrastructures for rent (for one time 
use or use under licensing conditions) or re-sale, along with data analysis and profiles.106 
Trading data and data services is a multi-billion dollar industry consisting of a diverse eco-
system of different types of data brokers ranging from very large consolidators to a range of 
specialist companies focused on particular markets or services. In 2014, Angwin identified 
212 data brokers operating in the US that consolidated and traded data about people, only 
92 of which allowed opt-outs (65 of which required handing over additional data to secure 
the opt-out), and 58 companies that were in the mobile location tracking business, only 11 
of which offered opt-outs.107 Data derived from smart city technologies and associated apps 
circulate within these data markets. 
The data and services these companies offer are used to perform a wide variety of tasks for 
which the data were never intended, including to predictively profile, socially sort, 
behaviourally nudge, and regulate, control and govern individuals and the various systems 
and infrastructures with which they interact.108 Smart city technologies and the data they 
generate thus have significant direct and in-direct impact on people’s everyday lives. These 
impacts can be both positive and negative, but in both cases raise numerous questions 
about privacy and privacy harms. 
For example, a key product of data brokers are predictive profiles of individuals as to their 
likely tastes and what goods and services they are likely to buy, or their likely value or worth 
to a business, or their credit risk and how likely they are to pay a certain price or be able to 
meet re-payments. These profiles can be used to socially sort and redline populations, 
selecting out certain categories to receive a preferential status and marginalising and 
excluding others. In other words, the profiles can be used to make decisions as to whether a 
person might be approved for a loan, or a tenancy or mortgage, or a job, or even what price 
they might pay in a store.109 This has led to concerns that a form of ‘data determinism’ is 
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being deployed in which individuals are not simply profiled and judged on the basis of what 
they have done, but on a prediction of what they might do in the future.110  
Data determinism is most clearly expressed in forms of anticipatory governance, such as 
that used in predictive policing, where predictive analytics are used to assess likely future 
behaviours or events and to direct appropriate action. A number of US police forces are now 
using predictive analytics to anticipate the location of future crimes and to direct police 
officers to increase patrols in those areas. For example, the Chicago police force produce 
both general area profiling to identify hotspots and guide patrols, and more specific profiling 
that identifies individuals within those hotspots.111 It achieves the latter using arrest 
records, phone records, social media and other data to construct the social networks of 
those arrested to identify who in their network is most likely to commit a crime in the 
future, designating them ‘pre-criminals’ and visiting them to let them know that they have 
been flagged in their system as a potential threat.112 In such cases, a person’s data shadow 
does more than follow them; it precedes them.  
In all these cases, few of those whose data has fed into creating predictive profiles imagined 
that their data were going to be repurposed to social sort or regulate or control them, or 
nudge them towards certain behaviours. As such, data repurposing can break what is 
considered compatible forms of data re-use and the reasonable expectations of data 
subjects.113 
5.3.6 Notice and consent is an empty exercise or is absent  
Notice and consent – considered the cornerstone of data and privacy protection – are 
significantly weakened within smart city technologies. Given issues of datafication, 
inference, repurposing and opacity, notice and consent can become an empty exercise or it 
is absent.  
As noted above, individuals interact with a number of smart city technologies on a daily 
basis, each of which is generating data about them. Given the volume and diversity of these 
interactions, it is simply too onerous for individuals to police their privacy across dozens of 
entities, to weigh up the costs and benefits of agreeing to terms and conditions without 
knowing how the data might be used now and in the future, and to assess the cumulative 
and holistic effects of their data being merged with other datasets.114 Even if someone 
wanted to proactively manage their data privacy across all these systems and apps, they 
would be faced with long, complex legal documents115 that in practice are non-negotiable – 
one either consents or is denied the service.116  
As a result, providing notice and seeking consent become an empty exercise as: ‘(1) people 
do not read privacy policies; (2) if people read them, they do not understand them; (3) if 
people read and understand them, they often lack enough background knowledge to make 
an informed choice; and (4) if people read them, understand them, and can make an 
informed choice, their choice might be skewed by various decision-making difficulties.’117 
Consent thus often consists of individuals unwittingly signing away rights without realising 
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the extent or consequences of their actions.118 The consequence is ‘privacy policies often 
serve more as liability disclaimers for businesses than as assurances of privacy for 
consumers.’119 Moreover, from a regulatory perspective, the question becomes ‘Did the 
data handler follow the right procedures to obtain consent?’ rather than ‘Did the data 
subject consent?’120  
In other cases, notice and consent are absent, either unimplemented or difficult to achieve 
in practice. As detailed in Box 3, between a quarter and a third of all smartphone apps lack a 
privacy policy and do not seek consent. Notice and consent for downstream activities such 
as data mining and repurposing are often covered by catch-all disclaimers, along with the 
right to unilaterally change terms and conditions without notice, effectively disenfranchising 
individuals of choice, control and the accountability of service providers. In the case of some 
smart city technologies, there is little mechanism to seek notice and consent, but also little 
choice in being surveilled. For example, CCTV, ANPR and MAC address tracking, and sensing 
by the Internet of Things all take place with no attempt at consent and often with little 
notification (though there may be notice in the form of information signs in the area being 
surveilled, or on related websites). Moreover, there is no ability to opt-out121 other than to 
avoid the area, which is unreasonable and unrealistic. As such, there is no sense in which a 
person can selectively reveal themselves; instead they must always reveal themselves.122 
Moreover, if a person is unaware that data about them is being generated, then it is all but 
impossible to discover and query the purposes to which those data are being put.123 
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6. Smart cities and data security concerns 
There are two key security concerns with respect to smart cities. The first is the security of 
smart city technologies and infrastructures and the extent to which they are vulnerable to 
being hacked via a cyberattack. The second is the security of the data generated, stored and 
shared across such technologies and infrastructures. The latter is directly related to the 
former as improper access to data is often achieved via security weaknesses in a system’s 
components, architecture and operation. In this sense, information security (data 
protection) has converged with operational security (making sure things work reliably and 
with integrity).124 
6.1 Operational security and cyberattack 
Smart city solutions utilise complex, networked assemblages of digital technologies and ICT 
infrastructure to manage various city systems and services. Any device that relies on 
software to function is vulnerable to being hacked. If a device is networked, then the 
number of potential entry points multiples across the network, and the hack can be 
performed remotely.125 Once a single device is compromised, then the whole assemblage 
becomes vulnerable to cyberattacks that seek to ‘alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy 
computer systems and networks or the information and/or programs resident in or 
transiting these systems or networks.’126 There are three forms of cyberattack: availability 
attacks that seek to close a system down or deny service use; confidentiality attacks that 
seek to extract information and monitor activity; and integrity attacks that seek to enter a 
system to alter information and settings (such as changing settings so that components 
exceed normal performance, erasing critical software, planting malware and viruses).127 The 
vulnerability of systems is exacerbated by a number of issues including weak security and 
encryption; the use of insecure legacy systems and poor maintenance; large and complex 
attack surfaces and interdependencies; cascade effects; and human error and disgruntled 
(ex) employees (see Box 5). The result is that the process of making city systems and 
infrastructures ‘smart’ has also made them vulnerable to a suite of cyber-threats.128  
Box 5: Types of security vulnerabilities 
Weak security and encryption  
All software-enabled devices are vulnerable to exploits and attacks. A Carnegie Mellon University 
report details that, on average, there are 30 bugs or possible exploits for every 1000 lines of code.129 
In complex systems with millions of lines of code that produces thousands of potential zero-day 
exploits130 for viruses, malware and hacks. The most common means of protection is to use 
encryption, usernames/passwords, firewalls, virus and malware checkers, security certificates, and 
security patch updates to close exploits to try and limit the ability of attackers to access software 
and data. However, the extent to which this suite of protections is used varies across technologies 
and vendors. Research by cybersecurity specialists has discovered that many smart city systems have 
been constructed with no or minimal security131 and city governments and vendors are deploying 
them without undertaking cybersecurity testing132 (see Box 6). In the case of some Internet of Things 
deployments, it can be difficult to ensure end-to-end security because most sensors and low-
powered devices on the market do not have sufficient computing power to support an encrypted 
link.133 Where encryption is used, security issues can arise due to poor key generation, fixed keys, 
shared keys, and leaked keys.134  
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The use of insecure legacy systems and poor maintenance 
A related issue is that many smart city technologies are layered onto much older infrastructure that 
relies on software and technology created 20 or 30 years ago, which has not been upgraded for 
some time, nor can they be migrated to newer, more secure systems.135 These technologies can 
create inherent vulnerabilities to newer systems by providing forever-day exploits.136 Some would go 
as far to say that any device or system that is not regularly patched and upgraded should be 
considered part of the ‘darknet’; that is, treated as if it is compromised.137 Even in the case of newer 
technologies, it can be difficult to test and rollout patches onto critical operational systems that 
need to always be on.138  
Large and complex attack surfaces and interdependencies 
Smart city systems are typically large, complex and diverse, with many interdependencies with other 
systems and many stakeholders involved. It can be difficult, therefore, to know what and how all the 
components are exposed, to measure and mitigate risks, and to ensure end-to-end security.139 Even 
if independent systems are secure, linking them to other systems will open them to risk with the 
level of security only guaranteed by the weakest link.140 Moreover, the interdependencies between 
technologies and systems mean that they are harder to maintain and upgrade.141 
Cascade effects  
The interdependencies between smart city technologies and systems have the potential to create 
cascade effects, wherein ‘highly interconnected entities rapidly transmit adverse consequences to 
each other.’142 For example, an attack on an energy system could cascade into an urban operating 
system that then cascades into the other systems such as traffic management, emergency services, 
water services, etc. Indeed, this is one of the key security and resilience risks of an urban operating 
system.143 A successful cyberattack on the electricity grid has huge cascade effects as it underpins so 
many activities such as powering homes, work, other infrastructure, and so on.144 
Human error and disgruntled (ex)employees 
Technical exploits can be significantly aided by human error, for example, employees opening 
phishing emails and installing viruses or malware, or inserting infected datasticks into computers.145 
Errors can also occur in relation to how data are released. For example, in 2014 a freedom of 
information request resulted in the release of data on 173 million journeys undertaken by New York 
taxis in one year. The data were incorrectly anonymised and relatively easy to decode, revealing the 
driver IDs, pickup and drop-off times, and GPS routes taken for all cab journeys.146 In other cases, 
security is not installed or is installed incorrectly, or manufacturer installed codes are not changed or 
system security is not kept up-to-date.147 In some cases, systems can be deliberately sabotaged by 
disgruntled present and ex-employees.148 
Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure have become a significant issue in recent years. Dell 
Security reported that there were 675,186 cyberattacks against industrial control systems in 
January 2014.149 Electricity grid utilities in the US report being under near constant 
cyberattack, with one utility recording that it was the target of approximately 10,000 
cyberattacks each month.150 The Israel Electric Corp. reports that its servers register about 
6,000 unique computer attacks every second, with other critical infrastructure also under 
continuous cyberattack.151 Many of these cyberattacks are relatively inconsequential, such 
as probes and address scans, and are unsuccessful, while a small number are much more 
significant and involve a security breach. In a 2014 study of 599 utility, oil and gas, energy 
and manufacturing companies, nearly 70 percent reported at least one security breach that 
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led to the loss of confidential information or disruption of operations in the previous 12 
months;152 78 percent expected a successful attack on their ICS (industrial control systems) 
or SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems in the next two years.153 In 
2012, 23 gas pipeline companies were hacked and source code and blueprints to facilities 
stolen.154 Between 2010 and 2014, the US Department of Energy (that oversees the US 
power grid, nuclear arsenal, and national labs) documented 1,131 cyberattacks, of which 
159 were successful.155 In 53 cases, these attacks were ‘root compromises’, meaning that 
the attackers gained administrative privileges to computer systems, stealing various kinds of 
personnel and operational information.156 These cyberattacks target every type of smart city 
solution and particular system components (see Box 6). Somewhat worryingly, most 
businesses are not aware that they have been hacked.157 One study found that the average 
time for detection was 210 days and in 92 percent of cases, the discovery was via an angry 
customer, law enforcement agency, or a contractor.158 
Table 7: IoT Attack Surface Areas 
Attack Surface Vulnerability Attack Surface Vulnerability 
Ecosystem 
Access Control 
Implicit trust between 
components 
Enrolment security 
Decommissioning system 
Lost access procedures 
Local Data 
Storage 
Unencrypted data 
Data encrypted with 
discovered keys 
Lack of data integrity checks 
Device Memory Cleartext usernames 
Cleartext passwords 
Third-party credentials 
Encryption keys 
Third-party 
Backend APIs 
Unencrypted PII sent 
Encrypted PII sent 
Device information leaked 
Location leaked 
Device Physical 
Interfaces 
Firmware extraction 
User CLI 
Admin CLI 
Privilege escalation 
Reset to insecure state 
Removal of storage media 
Vendor Backend 
APIs 
Inherent trust of cloud or 
mobile application 
Weak authentication 
Weak access controls 
Injection attacks 
Device Web 
Interface 
SQL injection 
Cross-site scripting 
Cross-site Request Forgery 
Username enumeration 
Weak passwords 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Update 
Mechanism 
Update sent without 
encryption 
Updates not signed 
Update location writable 
Update verification 
Malicious update 
Missing update mechanism 
No manual update 
mechanism 
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Attack Surface Vulnerability Attack Surface Vulnerability 
Device 
Firmware 
Hardcoded credentials 
Sensitive information 
disclosure 
Sensitive URL disclosure 
Encryption keys 
Firmware version display 
and/or last update date 
Ecosystem 
Communication 
Health checks 
Heartbeats 
Ecosystem commands 
Deprovisioning 
Pushing updates 
Device 
Network 
Services 
Information disclosure 
User CLI 
Administrative CLI 
Injection 
Denial of Service 
Unencrypted Services 
Poorly implemented 
encryption 
Test/Development Services 
Buffer Overflow 
UPnP 
Vulnerable UDP Services 
DoS 
Mobile 
Application 
Implicitly trusted by device or 
cloud 
Username enumeration 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Weak passwords 
Insecure data storage 
Transport encryption 
Insecure password recovery 
mechanism 
Two-factor authentication 
Administrative 
Interface 
SQL injection 
Cross-site scripting 
Cross-site Request Forgery 
Username enumeration 
Weak passwords 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Security/encryption options 
Logging options 
Two-factor authentication 
Inability to wipe device 
Cloud Web 
Interface 
SQL injection 
Cross-site scripting 
Cross-site Request Forgery 
Username enumeration 
Weak passwords 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Transport encryption 
Insecure password recovery 
mechanism 
Two-factor authentication 
Network Traffic LAN 
LAN to Internet 
Short range 
Non-standard 
  
Source: OWASP
159
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Cyberattacks can be performed by hostile nations, terrorist groups, cyber-criminals, hacker 
collectives, and individual hackers. Former FBI director, Robert Mueller, details that 108 
nations have cyberattack units, targeting critical infrastructure and industrial secrets.160 The 
majority of attacks are presently being repulsed using cybersecurity tools, or their effects 
have been disruptive or damaging but not critical for the long term delivery of services.161 
Indeed, it needs to be recognised that to date, successful cyberattacks on cities are still 
relatively rare and when they have occurred their effects generally last no more than a few 
hours or involve the theft of data rather than creating life threatening situations. That said, 
it is clear that there is a cybersecurity arms race underway between attackers and 
defenders, and that more severe disruption of critical infrastructure has been avoided 
through the threat of mutually assured destruction between nations.162 This is not to 
suggest that smart city initiatives should be avoided, but rather that the cybersecurity 
challenges of creating secure smart cities are taken seriously. As Box 6 details it is likely that 
cyberattacks will increase over time; they will become more sophisticated and have the 
potential to cause significant disruption to city services and the wider economy and 
society.163  
Box 6: Cybersecurity and smart city technologies 
All forms of smart city technologies are vulnerable to cyberattack. There are a number of weak 
points – including SCADA systems, the sensors and microcontrollers of the Internet of Things, and 
communication networks and telecommunication switches – which facilitate the kinds of security 
vulnerabilities set out in Box 5. 
SCADA systems 
Various forms of urban infrastructure, including the electricity grid, water supply, and traffic control, 
rely on SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems that are used to control functions 
and flow.164 These systems measure how an infrastructure is performing in real-time and enable 
either automated or human operator interventions to change settings. SCADA systems can be traced 
back to the 1920s, but were extensively rolled out in the 1980s.165 As a consequence, many 
deployments are quite dated. Many have been found to operate with their original security codes. In 
some cases, while the infrastructure is relatively secure, the communications network is 
vulnerable.166 A number of SCADA systems, as detailed below, have been compromised, with 
hackers altering how the infrastructure performs, or causing a denial-of-service, or have stolen data. 
Probably the most infamous SCADA hack was the 2009 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment 
plant in which the system was infected by malware that destroyed a number of centrifuges by 
running them beyond their design specifications.167 By 2010, over 90,000 Stuxnet infections were 
reported in 115 countries.168  
Cameras 
Cities are full of a plethora of CCTV cameras; some owned and controlled privately, others by public 
authorities and police services. The security of these cameras is highly variable, with some lacking 
encryption or usernames and passwords, and others open to infection by malware and firmware 
modification.169 Accessing a camera provides a means to spy on individuals, such as viewing home 
presence or using a bank ATM camera to monitor the digits being pressed. Demonstrating the scale 
of the issue, one website provides access to the feeds of thousands of unsecured or poorly secured 
cameras (uses admin passwords) from 152 countries.170 Cameras can also be turned off, with some 
lacking the function to be restarted remotely.171 
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Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things refers to the connecting together of machine-readable, uniquely identifiable 
objects across the Internet. Some objects are passive and can simply be scanned or sensed (such as 
smart cards with embedded RFID chips used to access buildings and transport systems). Others are 
more active and include microcontrollers and actuators. All kinds of objects that used to be dumb, 
such as fridges, thermostats and lights, are now becoming networked and smart, generating 
information about their use and becoming controllable from a distance. Moreover, sensors can be 
embedded into the urban fabric and throughout critical infrastructures to produce data concerning 
‘location, proximity, velocity, temperature, flow, acceleration, sound, vision, force, load, torque, 
pressure, and interactions.’172 Sensors and microcontrollers are hackable as they often have little 
effective security, encryption, or privacy protocols in place.173  
Communication networks and telecommunication switches 
The Internet of Things are linked together via a number of communications technologies and 
protocols such as 4G LTE (Long Term Evolution), GSM (Global System for Mobile communication), 
CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), WiFi, bluetooth, RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification), NFC 
(Near-Field Communication), ZigBee (open wireless standard), and Z-Wave (wireless 
communication). Each of the modes of networking and transferring data are known to have security 
issues that enable data to be intercepted and provide access to devices. Likewise, 
telecommunication switches that link together the local and long distance Internet infrastructure are 
known to have vulnerabilities including manufacturer and operator back-door security access and 
access codes that are infrequently updated.174 
Electricity grid and smart meters 
The generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity are monitored and controlled using 
SCADA systems.175 In addition, the electricity grid consists of a range of other networked devices. In 
the case of the US energy grid, over 70 percent of components are over 25 years old, including many 
SCADA systems.176 Given the potential cascade effects of shutting down the electricity grid, it has 
been a key point of cyberattack. As smart grids and smart meters are installed, the number of 
potential access points to grid networks increases enormously.177 Smart meters themselves can be 
hacked with low-cost tools and readily available software to alter proof of consumption or to steal 
energy from other users.178 
Building management systems  
Building management systems are often considered an aspect of property services rather than IT 
services and cybersecurity is not a key issue in purchase or operation.179 The consequence is weakly 
protected systems, often still configured with manufacturer codes. Moreover manufacturers often 
do not have processes in place for responding to vulnerabilities or a notification process to inform 
customers about security threats.180 The vulnerabilities of building management systems pose two 
main threats.181 The first is that if they are hacked building operations could be disrupted and safety 
risks created. The second is that they provide a potential route for breaking into enterprise business 
systems and critical company data if they share the same network.182  
Transport management systems and vehicles 
There have been a number of cyberattacks on transport management systems in recent years, as 
well as proof-of-concept demonstrations of possible attacks. For example, a cyberattack on a key toll 
road in Haifa, Israel, closed it for eight hours causing major traffic disruption.183 A research team 
from the University of Michigan managed to hack and manipulate more than a thousand traffic 
lights in one city using a laptop and wireless radio.184 Likewise, IOActive Labs have hacked traffic 
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control sensors widely used around the world and altered traffic light sequencing and interactive 
speed and road signs.185 A teenager in Lodz, Poland, managed to hack the city tram switches, causing 
four trams to derail and injuring a number of passengers.186 In the US, air traffic control systems 
have been hacked, FAA servers seized, the personal information of 58,000 workers stolen, and 
malicious code installed on air traffic networks.187 Vehicles themselves are also open to being hacked 
given that a new car contains up to 200 sensors connected to around 40 electronic control units and 
can connect to wireless networks.188  
 
6.2 Security of data 
Data-driven urbanism produces, processes, stores, and shares vast quantities of data and 
derived data and information. Much of these data are sensitive in nature. While some data 
can be made open and shared freely, as with data released through urban dashboards (see 
Box 2), most is considered private and needs to be held securely and kept protected. Given 
the value of data to cybercriminals for identity theft and blackmail, to companies for gaining 
industrial secrets, and nation states for security and cyberwar, they are much sought after.  
News concerning major data breaches or national surveillance programmes is, at present, 
an almost weekly occurrence, and it is clear that data security has become a significant 
weak point of networked endeavours. Informationisbeautiful.net provides details on 185 
data breaches, including the source and size of the breach.189 Over 100 of the incidents 
involve over 1 million customer accounts breached (with over 20 involving >100m records), 
with sensitive data stolen including names, addresses, social security numbers, credit card 
details, administrative and patient records. The Ponemon Institute reported in 2014, based 
on a survey of 567 executives of US businesses, that 43 percent of firms had experienced a 
data breach in the previous year involving the loss of more than 1000 records.190 The 
average cost to the company for each lost or stolen record was estimated to be $201, 
incurred through direct compensation to customers and credit card companies, class-action 
lawsuits by customers, shareholders and regulators, loss in share price, and investigation 
costs and new security measures.191 For example, the hack of Sony PlayStation in June 2011 
resulted in the loss of 77 million accounts including credit card details, names, addresses, 
date of birth, and log-in credentials, and cost the company more than $1 billion in lost 
business, law suits, and outside contractors.192 The consequence for the individuals to 
whom the data refers is identity theft, leading to criminal activity that is attributed to them, 
and the stress and effort involved in trying to clear one’s name. 12.6 million Americans were 
reportedly the victims of identity theft in 2012 at the collective loss of $21 billion.193  
Data breaches occur for all the reasons detailed in Box 5 and have become more common 
because the lines of attack have grown as more and more systems and infrastructures 
become networked. And yet, it is apparent that in too many cases, security is an 
afterthought, applied after a system has been developed and prototyped, and that 
companies are often more interested in convenience, minimisation of downtime, and 
marginal efficiency than security and compliance.194 In the Ponemon Institute study, 27 
percent of companies did not have a data breach response plan or team in place and 46 
percent did not have privacy and data protection awareness training for employees and 
other stakeholders who have access to sensitive personal information.195 Of those 
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companies with a plan only 30 percent said their organisation was effective or very effective 
in developing and executing it.196 In a separate Unisys and Ponemon Institute survey of 
critical infrastructure companies, only 28 percent ranked security as one of the top five 
strategic priorities for their organisation.197 Moreover, 58 percent reported that they only 
partially or never vetted contractors, vendors and other third-parties for high security 
standards.198 Only 17 percent of companies described their cybersecurity as mature, and 
only 6 percent provided cyber-security training for all employees.199 
With respect to smart city technologies specifically, it is clear that many vendors have little 
or no experience in embedding security features into their products and many systems 
possess significant vulnerabilities200 (see Box 6). These vendors can impede security 
research by limiting access to their systems for testing, enabling them to continue to release 
unsecured products without oversight or accountability.201 As troubling, most cities have 
limited cybersecurity budgets and resources and do not have cyberattack threat models 
prepared, mitigation strategies developed, and response plans in place, nor do they have 
designated cybersecurity personnel and leadership (in the form of CIOs and CTOs202) and 
CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams), meaning they lack an effective, coordinated 
reaction if their systems are hacked.203 Cybersecurity expertise is usually limited to a handful 
of personnel and training across the entire workforce is limited (increasing the likelihood of 
human error issues). Any cybersecurity plans cities do possess are often siloed with respect 
to particular systems and departments, so that cross-function assessment and response is 
lacking.204 Indeed, it is often not clear who is responsible when a smart city is hacked or 
crashes,205 especially when there are multiple systems and stakeholders involved. It is thus 
important that smart city designers and planners and city leaders start to take more 
seriously the threat of cyberattack and the ‘normal accidents’206 that threaten operational 
and data security. 
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7. Addressing data privacy and security concerns with 
respect to the smart city 
It is clear from the discussion so far that there are a number of data privacy, protection and 
security concerns and challenges created through the rollout of smart city technologies. 
Addressing these issues is no simple task, both politically and pragmatically. Indeed, there 
are two distinct levels to the debate. The first examines more general normative questions 
concerning the ethics and politics of mass surveillance enabled by smart city technologies 
and the use of urban big data in predictive profiling, social sorting, anticipatory governance 
and the management of city populations, infrastructures and services. The second level is 
more concerned with how to best implement data privacy, protection and security given 
present legislation and expected norms.  
These two levels are strongly related given that a position held with respect to the first 
directly influences the position taken with respect to the second. For example, a position 
that accepts the need for mass surveillance and the erosion of privacy will advocate for 
different interventions than a position that is much more committed to individual privacy 
and personal autonomy. At present, the debate over the mass surveillance of society largely 
hinges on two inherent trade-offs: between privacy and national security; and between 
privacy and economic growth.207  
In the first case, surveillance is cast as a choice between creating safer societies or 
defending personal autonomy. On the one side, trust is traded for control, and all citizens 
are treated as potential threats without warranted suspicion for the greater good of 
national security. On the other side, privacy is seen as an ‘indispensable structural feature of 
liberal democratic political systems’208 and is foundational to informed and reflective 
citizenship and to freedom of expression.209 The danger of mass surveillance for the latter is 
the loss of core societal values of freedom and liberty to be replaced by highly controlled 
and authoritarian societies.  
In the second case, the mass generation of data about customers is cast as a choice 
between creating new products, markets, jobs and wealth or individual and collective rights. 
On the one side, it is argued that data privacy and security should not hinder innovation and 
the extraction of economic value of individual data, or impede customer experience.210 
Without new innovations, it is suggested, the economy will stagnate and society will suffer. 
On the other side, it is contended that it is possible to extract value from big data and create 
new products without infringing on privacy and aggressively micro-targeting and profiling 
individuals.211 
Within both trade-off cases, privacy is often positioned as mutually exclusive from national 
security and economic development. Privacy, the argument goes, is dead or dying,212 even if 
there are those who do not fully realise it yet; it has been sacrificed for the supposed 
greater good. Further, those in favour of the mass generation of data resort to arguments 
such as ‘if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear’, or ‘if you do not like how we 
operate, do not use our service.’ As critics note, the first assertion conflates privacy with the 
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concealment of suspicious behaviour, as opposed to personal autonomy, freedom of 
expression, and the selective choice to reveal oneself.213 The second is entirely impractical 
and unreasonable given that email, online banking and shopping, credit cards, smartphones, 
social media, and so on, are the tools of modern life, necessary for a career and social life.214 
Opting out is not a viable choice. Indeed, with respect to many smart city technologies, 
opting out is not even an option. 
While the privacy debate can sometimes be framed in quite black and white terms, the 
reality is that it is really full of greys. Privacy is not dead, though it is certainly under attack 
and in transition, and privacy is not mutually exclusive to national security and economic 
development. Privacy does still remain a key value for individuals, even if they find it 
increasingly difficult to manage and protect in practice.215 It is still protected through 
legislative and regulatory instruments, even if these presently struggle with the unfolding 
data revolution. Moreover, people and companies want their data to remain secure. The 
real issue is the balance between privacy and other interests and ensuring the right tools are 
in place to maintain the balance desired. 
The following practical and pragmatic solutions to data privacy, protection and security 
concerns and harms related to smart cities are framed within a position that does not see 
privacy and security/development as mutually exclusive and which still values the FIPPs set 
out in Table 5. Following Angwin, it attempts to find a middle way between ‘those who ask 
us to hand over all our data and ‘get over it,’ and those who suggest that we throw our body 
on the tracks in front of the speeding train that is our data economy.’216 In this sense, the 
aim has been to identify solutions that enable the rollout of smart city technologies, but to 
do so in a way that is not prejudicial to citizens; that actively work to minimise privacy 
harms, minimises data breaches, and tackles cybersecurity issues; and that work across the 
entire life-cycle (from procurement to decommissioning) and the span of a whole system 
ecology (all its stakeholders and components).  
The approach advocated is multi-pronged as there is no single solution for all of the 
concerns detailed above. Rather a suite of solutions is needed, some of which are market 
driven, some more technical in nature, others more governance and management 
orientated, and some more policy, regulatory and legally focused. Together these will enact 
what has been termed ‘smart privacy’ – a broad arsenal of protections including: ‘privacy by 
design; law, regulation and independent oversight; accountability and transparency; market 
forces; education and awareness; audit and control; data security; and fair information 
practices.’217 Importantly, the approaches advocated are not heavy handed in nature, 
seeking mutual consensus, collaboration and to be enabling rather than restrictive. 
Moreover, they should be relatively inexpensive to implement as they are principally about 
changing practices and redeploying existing resources and staff more effectively. 
7.1 Market solutions 
Market solutions to privacy and security issues generally fall into two camps. The first is a 
contention that the market will adapt to self-regulate privacy and data security in line with 
societal demand for fear of losing customers and market share.218 The main problem with 
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this argument is that it assumes that companies will actively self-regulate as opposed to 
resist and block change, that individuals have the freedom and choice to move their custom, 
and that any abuses of privacy will be enough to enact such behaviour. Some companies are 
effectively quasi-monopolies in particular domains, with consumers having few other 
choices. Further, while some companies will be ethical and conscientious in seeking to 
ensure data privacy and security, market regulation does not solve the issue of vendors who 
wilfully abuse privacy rights or are negligent in their data security practices. Moreover, 
individuals often do not understand the implications of terms and conditions associated 
with different products and systems, nor their privacy rights, and often do not act in their 
own self-interest. 
The evidence suggests that companies generally only change privacy policies to favour their 
own interests or when under duress and to comply with legislation and regulation219. 
Indeed, in many cases, privacy policy changes are to update terms and conditions to cover 
more extensive data generation and data uses and to further limit liabilities. Here, 
companies have used the emergence of big data to undermine and work around FIPP 
expectations. Moreover, there has been active lobbying to reduce data protection 
provisions designed to address many of the issues detailed in Section 5.3. With respect to 
data security, companies will often prioritise convenience, service continuity, cost savings 
and marginal efficiency over security.220 As such, while undoubtedly self-regulation has a 
role to play in protecting data privacy, it cannot be the only solution, with a need for 
governance mechanisms and legal and regulatory tools and oversight to ensure compliance. 
The second market solution is for companies to see consumer privacy and data security as a 
competitive advantage, developing privacy and security protocols and tools that will attract 
consumers away from other vendors.221 For example, companies developing products that 
have limited tracking or profiling, or end-to-end encryption. While welcome, the concern is 
that privacy and security might become a two-tiered system, available for a fee rather than 
as a right. In addition, as data breaches and privacy scandals continue to tarnish the 
development of inter-networked products and services, the cybersecurity industry itself will 
continue to grow to provide enhanced privacy and security tools and technologies. Such 
technical solutions will be aimed at individuals so that they can more effectively manage 
their privacy, and companies and public authorities so that they can better protect their 
operational security, data resources, and the privacy of their customers and clients. 
7.2 Technology solutions 
As noted, too many smart city technologies have large attack surfaces that have a number 
of vulnerabilities, especially in systems that contain legacy components using old software 
which has not been regularly patched. Technology solutions to data privacy and security 
seek to use technical fixes and products to effectively manage systems and tackle risks. At 
one level, this consists of implementing best practice solutions in building and maintaining 
secure smart city infrastructures and systems.  
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This includes:  
 strong, end-to-end encryption;  
 strong passwords and access controls;  
 firewalls; 
 up-to-date virus and malware checkers; 
 security certificates; 
 audit trails; 
 isolating trusted resources from non-trusted;  
 disabling unnecessary functionality; 
 ensuring that there are no weak links between components;  
 isolating components where possible from a network; 
 implementing fail safe and manual overrides on all systems;  
 ensuring full backup of data and recovery mechanisms; and 
 automatically installing security patch updates on all components, including firmware, 
software, communications, and interfaces.222  
The aim is to reduce the attack surface as much as possible and to make the surface that is 
visible as robust and resilient as possible.  
At another, complementary level, the approach has been to develop a suite of Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies (PETs) that seek to provide individuals with tools to protect their PII 
and dictate how PII should be handled by different services. PETs have been defined by the 
European Commission as ‘a coherent system of information and communication technology 
measures that protect privacy by eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing 
unnecessary and/or undesired processing of personal data without losing the functionality 
of the information system.’223 In effect, PETs seek to minimise data generation, increase 
individual control of PII, choose the degree of online anonymity and linkability of data, track 
the use of their data, gain meaningful consent, and facilitate legal rights of data inspection, 
correction and deletion.224 PETs include relatively simple tools such as ad blockers, cookie 
blockers and removers, malware detection and interception, site blocking, encryption tools, 
and services to opt-out of databases held by data brokers.225 In general, these kinds of PETs 
are aimed at protecting PII on websites and smartphones and managing how data are 
handled by data brokers and have limited application with respect to many smart city 
technologies which generate data about people in a different way (through cameras, smart 
card readers, sensors, etc.). Other approaches such as statistical disclosure control (SDC), 
private information retrieval (PIR), and privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) are aimed at 
protecting confidentiality in data analysis and the release of public datasets, database 
retrieval, and data mining.226  
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7.3. Policy, regulatory and legal solutions 
While market-driven and technological solutions will have a number of positive effects, how 
they are administered is framed by the wider policy, regulatory and legal landscape. It is 
clear that the present regulatory and legal tools with respect to privacy and security are not 
fit for purpose in the age of urban big data and algorithmic governance and need revision. It 
is not the intention of this report to prescribe new legal and regulatory provisions for smart 
cities and privacy and security more broadly. Indeed, this is the focus of a number of 
initiatives already at the EU and national level. Instead, it advocates the use of four 
pragmatic policy approaches which seek to address privacy and security harms and 
concerns. 
7.3.1 Fair information practice principles (FIPPs) 
FIPPs are the core principles underlying the generation, use and disclosure of personal data 
and the obligations of data controllers. A number of the principles set out in Table 5 have 
been eroded since FIPPs were first published by the OECD in 1980, in part due to the active 
lobbying of the data industry to limit their liabilities and responsibilities and extend the 
value they can extract from data, and in part due to the rise of big data and the fundamental 
changes in the nature of data. The fact that FIPPs are now difficult to apply in practice and 
are routinely being circumvented has highlighted the need to revisit and revise them. This 
need has been recognised in the EU and a number of countries, such as the US, Canada and 
New Zealand.227 For example, The White House (2012) sets out a revised set of FIPPs in its 
‘Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights’ for the big data age.  
 Individual Control: Consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data 
companies collect from them and how they use it.  
 Transparency: Consumers have a right to easily understandable and accessible 
information about privacy and security practices.  
 Respect for Context: Consumers have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, 
and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which 
consumers provide the data.  
 Security: Consumers have a right to secure and responsible handling of personal data.  
 Access and Accuracy: Consumers have a right to access and correct personal data in 
usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk 
of adverse consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate. 
 Focused Collection: Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the personal data 
that companies collect and retain. 
 Accountability: Consumers have a right to have personal data handled by companies 
with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights.  
These updated FIPPs extend those officially advocated by the FTC, and widen the scope of 
shared principles, expanding consumer control over information at issue and how the data 
are used.228 The FTC and EU have also focused recently on re-emphasising the need for data 
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minimisation.229 While this reworking of FIPPs is important, critics argue that they do not go 
far enough in protecting against many of the issues detailed in Section 5.3, especially 
predictive privacy harms arising from inferencing, data being shared, repurposed and used 
in unpredictable and unexpected ways, and notice and consent being an empty exercise or 
absent.230 Nonetheless, revised FIPPs fit for the big data age would provide an important 
core set of underlying principles for the deployment of privacy and security-led smart city 
technologies. 
7.3.2 Privacy by design 
One means by which FIPPs can become much more central to the development of smart city 
technologies is through the adoption of privacy by design. While regulatory and legislative 
compliance seeks to ensure that vendors and cities fulfil their obligations with respect to 
privacy by correctly and fairly handling the data they generate and manage, privacy by 
design proposes that privacy is the default mode of operation231. Rather than collecting 
data, assuming they are all available for use (unless the individual does not consent, which 
effectively means they are denied the service), all data remain private unless the consumer 
explicitly says otherwise. In other words, privacy is hardwired into the design specifications 
and usage of information technology, business practices, physical environments, and 
infrastructure of systems and apps through the adoption of seven foundational principles 
(see Table 8)232. Because these are principles and not a set of prescribed methods, they 
provide latitude for different modes of implementation. The approach is positioned as a 
‘positive-sum’ (rather than zero-sum) solution that does not rely on trade-offs between 
privacy rights and other issues such as security or economic development, but rather seeks 
to maximise both233. The use of privacy by design has been advocated by the EU, FTC and a 
number of national information/data protection commissioners. 
Table 8: The principles of privacy by design 
Principle Description 
Proactive not reactive; 
preventative not remedial 
IT systems should seek to anticipate privacy concerns rather than 
seeking to resolve privacy infractions once they have incurred 
Privacy as the default setting Privacy is automatically protected and does not require action on 
behalf of an individual 
Privacy embedded into 
design 
Privacy protections are core features of the design and architecture 
of IT systems and is not a bolt-on feature 
Full functionality - positive-
sum, not zero-sum 
All legitimate interests and objectives are accommodated, rather 
than there being trade-offs between privacy and other 
considerations such as security 
End-to-end security - full 
lifecycle protection 
Privacy is embedded into the system from ingestion to disposal 
Visibility and transparency - 
keep it open 
Component parts and operations are visible and transparent to users 
and providers alike and are subject to independent verification 
Respect for user privacy - 
keep it user-centric 
A system should be built around, protect the interests, and empower 
individuals 
Source: Cavoukian (2009) 
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7.3.3. Security by design 
Complementary to privacy by design is security by design. Likewise, a proactive and 
preventative rather than reactive and remedial approach is taken to security, seeking to 
build it into systems from the outset rather than layering it on afterwards. This requires 
security risk assessment to be a fundamental part of the design process and security 
measures to be rigorously tested before the product is launched,234 including a test pilot 
phase within a living lab environment that includes testing the security of a product when 
deployed as part of a wider network of technologies (to ensure end-to-end security). It also 
means having in place an on-going commitment to cybersecurity, including a mechanism to 
monitor products throughout their life cycle, a process of supporting and patching them 
over time, and a procedure for notifying customers when security risks are identified. A key 
commitment of security by design is for end-to-end encryption and strong access controls, 
including forcing adopters to change default passwords,235 and to only keep data essential 
for the task being performed and transferring data in aggregated form where possible.236 
7.3.4. Education and training 
Revised FIPPs, privacy-by-design and security-by-design provide practical policy 
interventions aimed at shaping how privacy and security are tackled by those developing 
smart city technologies. There is a need for these to be complemented with education and 
training policies aimed at shaping users’ understanding of how these technologies work and 
their privacy and security practices, and to inform developers of their obligations and best 
practices. To this end, four national education and training programmes are advocated.  
The first is a general education programme directed at the public that sets out the privacy 
and security implications of various smart city technologies and the practical steps they can 
take to protect themselves against privacy and security harms. This would be 
complemented by an educational programme aimed at school children that warns them 
about the data being generated about them and informs them about how to best to 
manage their data privacy and security. The third is a training programme aimed at local 
authority staff who are involved in the development of smart city policy formulation, the 
procurement of smart city technologies, or the rollout and running of smart city initiatives. 
This programme would include a general overview of data protection obligations, but also a 
grounding in how to evaluate privacy and security concerns and implement privacy/security 
impact assessments. The fourth is a training programme aimed at technology companies, 
and in particular start-ups and SMEs who might not have the in-house capacity for privacy 
and security expertise, to set out their obligations and best practices that might give them a 
competitive advantage. In the Irish case this training might be delivered through the fifteen 
Enterprise Ireland technology centres, or via the Start-Up Commissioner or agencies such as 
The Digital Hub and NDRC (National Digital Research Centre) that run support programmes 
for start-ups, or university sponsored tech incubators and innovation hubs. 
7.4 Governance and management solutions 
A critical component of well-run city systems and infrastructures is their governance and 
management structures and processes. Governance provides the framework through which 
54 
strategic direction is deliberated and set, and regulation and oversight administered. 
Management consists of leading and driving forward initiatives and stewarding the day-to-
day running of services. Together they frame the rollout and maintenance of city systems 
and infrastructures and ensure they work as intended, fulfil their ambitions and strategic 
intent, and stay within legal and regulatory parameters.  
Putting in place strong principle-led governance and management is therefore a 
prerequisite for creating a smart city that seeks to maximise benefits while minimising 
harms. And yet, to date, there are very few documented cases of such governance and 
management structures being constituted. Instead, smart city initiatives have been 
procured and developed with little coordinated consideration of privacy and security harms 
and slotted into existing city management in an ad hoc fashion with minimal strategic 
oversight.  
Given the potential harms and the associated costs that can arise, and the potential benefits 
at stake, this piecemeal approach needs to be discontinued to be replaced with a more 
strategic, coordinated approach that consists of interventions at three levels: vision and 
strategy (smart city advisory board); oversight of delivery and compliance (smart city 
governance, ethics and security oversight committee); and day-to-day delivery (core 
privacy/security team and computer emergency response team). This approach recognises 
that there is a need for collaboration between experts in different domains to ensure 
sharing of knowledge and shared learning. 
7.4.1. Smart city advisory boards  
A smart city advisory board is a high-level forum for the strategic visioning of the 
composition, form and ambition of its smart city plan and the principles underpinning the 
deployment and management of smart city initiatives. The aim is to create a broad 
consensus as to: 
 how the evolving smart city should unfold; 
 how it will align and shape the wider city development plan; 
 the ethos and ethics underlying the smart city agenda; 
 the necessary governance and management structures; and 
 the sourcing of necessary resources and finances, and the means to evaluate rollout 
and success.  
From these deliberations, smart city policies will be formulated, including the adoption of an 
ethical framework that sets out clearly the FIPPs adopted. Over time, the role of the 
advisory board will evolve to consider whether the smart city programme is on-track, is 
fulfilling its ambition and is meeting its principles, as well as whether its governance and 
management is functioning well.  
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The advisory board should consist of a panel of key stakeholders, including representatives 
of local and regional government, other relevant state agencies, regulatory bodies, private 
companies and their representative bodies, third sector groups, and community 
organisations. Members should have relevant knowledge and expertise of smart city 
technologies and related concerns and harms, urban planning and development, city 
governance and management, and local community issues. Given that the intent is strategic 
and agenda setting, rather than direct oversight or management, the advisory board would 
ideally meet two or three times a year. 
As yet, there seem to be few examples of documented, formally constituted smart city 
advisory boards.237 The Smart London Board238 is one case, drawing together experts from 
academia, business and entrepreneurship to guide the development of London’s smart city 
strategy. One of its first deliverables was the Smart London Plan.239 Seattle does not have 
smart city advisory board, but has established a privacy advisory board that sets out a set of 
principles with respect to smart city technologies and the wider use of digital technologies 
by city authorities (see Box 7). Seattle’s approach is instructive because it does reaffirm the 
use of FIPPs and seeks to establish an ethical framework to guide data privacy and security 
with respect to smart city technologies. 
Box 7: Seattle Privacy Advisory Committee  
In response to the privacy implications of smart city technologies and a number of criticisms of the 
city’s data practices, Seattle has established a Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC) to assess the ways 
in which the city authorities generate, store and use data, and to consider issues such as 
confidentiality, anonymity, archival procedures, deletion, sharing and publishing as open data, and 
the ability to conduct forensic internal audits.240  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
The PAC initiative is led by the city’s Department of Information Technology and its Chief Technology 
Officer and consists of various public and private stakeholders,241 including the city police, fire, 
lighting, transportation, information technology and law departments, Seattle Public Library, 
academics and industry leaders.  
The PAC is tasked with setting out a set of principles with respect to data privacy and developing a 
privacy toolkit. This toolkit includes annual privacy and security classes to educate city departments 
and workers on the latest privacy practices and access compliance, and implementing a Privacy 
Impact Assessment (PIA) protocol for evaluating the risks for new forms of data collection.242 The 
PIAs will be made available on a publicly accessible website. The aim is to continue to evolve the 
city’s privacy policies and practices as new technologies and legal obligations dictate.243 
The PAC has published a set of basic privacy principles.244 In essence, these principles simply confirm 
that the city is following FIPPs and its already existing legal obligations. They are complemented by a 
much more detailed privacy statement245 that sets out the city policy on privacy issues.  
Critics would like the PAC to have a wider membership and be supplemented with an executive-level 
Chief Privacy Officer and a core team of dedicated staff who have responsibility for ensuring that the 
privacy principles and toolkit are implemented, and constitute a single point of contact for all city 
departments with regards to privacy queries from the public.246 Nonetheless, the PAC and the city’s 
approach to privacy is a useful approach and instructive for other cities. 
 
7.4.2. Smart city governance, ethics and security oversight committee 
A smart city governance, ethics and security oversight committee is much more 
operationally focused than an advisory boards. Their intent is to: 
 oversee and audit the work of the privacy/security team;  
 advise on the work priorities and programme; 
 certify that the city’s smart city strategies are being implemented and meeting targets 
and that they conform to legal and regulatory requirements;  
 ensure that response and mitigation plans and processes are in place; and 
 ensure there is clear communication to public concerning how the smart city is being 
realised and how data are being generated, used, stored and shared.247  
With respect to the latter, Transport for London (TfL) is a model organisation setting out 
very clear data use and retention policies (see Box 8).  
A task for the governance, ethics and security oversight committee would be to certify 
smart city ethics/security assessments in line with adopted FIPPs. For each smart city 
initiative, these assessments would determine: 
 what data are to be generated; 
 how the data are to be processed and analysed and what derived data can be 
produced; 
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 the ownership and access to the data and derived data; 
 the conjoining of data with other datasets;  
 how the data might be leveraged and repurposed; 
 the sharing and transfer of data to third parties; 
 the presentation/publication of information derived from the data; 
 the security of data and how the data are stored; and 
 the plans for dealing with breaches and hacks. 
During the procurement process, the extent to which the proposed solutions meet these 
parameters would influence the evaluation of tenders. For smart city initiatives that are 
already deployed, the assessments would be used to evaluate how closely they match the 
desired parameters and to develop a roadmap for achieving future compliance with the 
city’s desired formulation. This is important because it is incumbent on city authorities to 
broker privacy and security arrangements on behalf of citizens, given that notice and 
consent are all but impossible in many cases. In this way, the city gets to shape the privacy 
and data protection landscape through its contracting procedures and parameters. In all 
cases of potential and existing smart city initiatives, all vendors should be asked for full 
privacy and security documentation and service level agreements should include on-time 
patching and 24/7 incident response.248 
A smart city governance, ethics and security oversight committee should meet four to six 
times a year and be composed of a small number of expert external members (three to four) 
and a small group of key city officials, including any CIOs, CTOs or CDOs249 and the head of 
the privacy/security core team. Governance, risk and oversight boards are a statutory 
feature of public sector bodies in many jurisdictions, and the smart city version will need to 
be accommodated within the existing governance structure. 
Box 8: Transparent data policy: Transport for London (TfL) 
Transport for London (TfL) is the local government body responsible for public transport in London, 
with responsibility for running and overseeing over-ground and underground rail, buses, water 
services, cycling, taxis and private hire, and dial-a-ride services.250  
As a large organisation coordinating travel for millions of passengers daily, TfL generates and 
manages a massive amount of data from a diverse set of sources including: websites and 
smartphone apps, CCTV in stations and on trains and buses, contactless and credit card payments, 
Oyster cards (inc. photo in some cases), congestion charging, bike use, lost luggage requests, taxi 
licensing, its 25,000+ employees, job applicants, etc. 
TfL has adopted a transparent approach to data privacy and data protection policies, which are 
published on their website.251 These policies are short, clear and unambiguous, written in plain 
English that avoids dense legal language. 
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For each type of data TfL detail: what personal information they hold, why they collect that 
information, how they use the information; the length of time they keep it before deleting (varies 
from 24 hours to 7 years, depending on type and purpose252), how they secure it, how they share it, 
if any of the data are processed overseas, how someone can access the data held about them, any 
relevant privacy notices. Where necessary links are provided to specific pieces of external policy or 
regulation/law.  
7.4.3. Core privacy/security team 
The core privacy/security team is responsible for the day-to-day delivery of the city’s 
strategy and policies, and undertaking the work within the framework dictated by the 
governance, ethics and security oversight committee. Its work would include:  
 liaising with the city departments and companies administering smart city initiatives; 
 undertaking threat and risk modelling;  
 testing the security of smart city technologies (rather than simply trusting vendor 
reassurances);  
 conducting smart city ethics/security assessments (including privacy impact 
assessments);  
 coordinating staff training on privacy and security issues; and 
 communicating smart city policies to the public.  
As a routine part of their work, the core privacy/security team should consult with 
cybersecurity vendors to stay up-to-date on potential threats and solutions.253 In addition, 
the team should create a formal channel for security feedback and ethical disclosure, 
enabling bugs and security weaknesses to be reported by members of the public and 
companies.254 Ethics and security assessments should be carried out as early as possible, for 
example in the scoping and procurement phases of technological adoption, to ensure the 
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solutions developed conform to expectations. The team would consist of a number of 
dedicated staff. 
7.4.4. City Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) 
CERTs consist of a team of key personnel, drawn from the core privacy/security team, IT 
services, smart city initiatives and emergency services, that spring into action when a smart 
city technology experiences a cybersecurity incident and is hacked and records stolen or the 
system disrupted or terminated.255 In this sense, they are similar to other emergency 
response teams that tackle other city events. CERTs prepare detailed plans of action and 
accountability/responsibility in the case of different types of incidents.256 These plans are 
reviewed and updated on a regular basis as new technologies are rolled out. In the context 
of Ireland, given the size of the cities and institutional capacities it might be that local 
authority and city cybersecurity needs will be covered solely by the new National Cyber 
Security Centre (NCSC) which hosts the national/governmental Computer Security Incident 
Response Team (CSIRT-IE)257. In addition, the Irish Reporting and Information Security 
Service, an independent non-for-profit company, also provides a CERT service258. 
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8. Conclusion 
The danger with a report focused on data privacy, data protection and data security in the 
context of smart cities is that it becomes overly focused on the negative concerns and 
harms. These concerns can then segue into a highly cautious approach which stifles 
innovation and rollout that means the potential benefits of smart cities are not realised. 
However, while the concerns relating to smart cities are significant, we need to remain 
mindful of their potential benefits in producing more efficient, productive, sustainable, 
resilient, transparent, fair and equitable cities.  
The challenge is to acknowledge that there are a set of very real issues and concerns that do 
need to be addressed, and to find and adopt solutions to these that also enable the benefits 
of smart city technologies to be gained. In other words, there is a need to chart a path that 
is neither so luddite that no developments can occur, nor too boosterist or scare-mongering 
that fundamental values of privacy, liberty and freedom are sacrificed for a data economy or 
a surveillant, securitised state.  
Ignoring or deliberately avoiding smart city technologies is not a viable approach; nor is 
developing smart cities that create a range of harms and reinforce power imbalances. 
Rather we need to create a particular kind of smart city that has a set of ethical principles 
and values at its heart. Such a balanced approach is not straightforward to conceive or 
implement given the diverse set of stakeholders and vested interests at work in the smart 
city space.  
This report provides one vision of a balanced strategy to data privacy, data protection and 
data security in the context of smart cities and advocates a multi-pronged approach that 
blends together market, technical, governance and management, and policy, regulatory and 
legal solutions. Together these solutions seek to promote fairness and equity, protect 
citizens and cities from harms, and enable the benefits of smart cities and urban big data to 
be realised. Moreover, they do so using an approach that is not heavy handed in nature and 
is relatively inexpensive to implement. 
The next step is for the good practice developed so far to be built on, and the solutions 
suggested to be advanced further conceptually, deployed in practice, and evaluated, with 
iterative learning applied. What cannot be allowed to happen is a continuation of the ad hoc 
and arbitrary approach taken to date and data privacy, data protection and data security 
harms to multiply unchecked. We need to be smart in our approach to smart cities. 
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